Don’t Demonize the Chechens as “Terrorists”Chechnya is a test of all the West’s new-found principles and of its ability to define terrorism. The Chechens are not fighting for a terrorist cause, and they should not pay the price for stronger ties with Russia.
by Andrew Gardner
PRAGUE, Czech Republic--Tony Blair on 2 October set out the case for a war against terrorism and set out his aim that “lasting good” might emerge from the “shadow of this evil.” The world should be “re-ordered.” Africa, “a scar on the conscience of the world,” should be healed.
His ambition may be questioned, but not his fervor, and since a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step, this first step to a better world is welcome. The test, though, comes when he troops down from the high ground of natural law to the boggy lowlands of realpolitik. And he immediately headed for lower ground by flying to Moscow to meet Vladimir Putin to secure Russian support for attacks on Afghanistan. The biggest bog here is Chechnya.
For Chechnya is a test of justice, a test of the West’s ability to identify its “terrorist” enemies, and of its ability not to demonize Islam. It is a test of justice because it should also be a scar on the conscience of the civilized world. It is a test of the West’s power of definition, because of Putin’s routine damnation of Chechen fighters as “terrorists.” And it is a test of its ability not to demonize Islam, since the presence of mujaheddin in Chechnya fuels the temptation to view the Chechen case as an Islamist, terrorist cause.
But first, is Chechnya a scar on the conscience? The evidence of execution, torture, mutilation, rape, and extortion barely needs repeating for anyone except those who choose to turn a blind eye. And that is not to mention the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of military force against an entire population--and the resulting flood of refugees.
The Russian army and paramilitary appear to be out of control and on the take (selling corpses back to Chechen families is one particularly macabre line of business). Unfortunately, Putin seems to have no desire to rein them in. Apart from ritually denying or downplaying accusations, he is on record as calling Chechens “bastards” who need to be “[wiped] out in the shit house” with a “control shot to the head,” and saying that "the Chechens should not rejoice” at a moratorium on the death penalty “as they are not going to be taken alive." If he plays to the gallery in this way, one can only wonder how much he panders to the military gallery’s and his own most self-serving and atavistic impulses behind the scenes.
Not only have Western leaders not joined in the chorus of outrage, but there is also little evidence of substantive pressure on Putin. Like others, Blair the moral visionary has turned a blind eye. But he, perhaps more than his colleagues, has cause for a particularly troubled conscience, for reasons exemplified by his decision to meet Putin before last year’s presidential elections. By doing so, he effectively endorsed Putin ahead of time, and also appeared too close to condoning the military deployment in Chechnya launched by Putin, a move widely viewed as an electoral ploy. On Chechyna, he simply said human-rights allegations should be investigated. This was no longer, it seemed, a “brutal” campaign that was “totally out of proportion,” as he had called it in December 1999.
Ever since, his tone toward Putin has remained dulcet. But his statement last week that “we need Russia as a partner and a friend” because “we face common interests and common dangers” could take this distastefully cosy relationship to a level verging on complicity, for the “terrorists” Putin repeatedly talks of are Chechens. On Chechnya at least, Blair is starting on the moral low ground.
THE BATTLE OF DEFINITION
Assuming principles count, the first battle line (after sheer human compassion) is language: Are Chechens terrorists or a nation at war? Unfortunately, the word “terrorism” seems to be as slippery as alleged mastermind Osama bin Laden himself. Moreover, war, like terrorism, is full of terrible acts. As a result, for a politician to say the perpetrator of a terrible act is therefore a terrorist empties the word of substance and plays on fear. It is demonization, and demonization is the rhetoric Putin has chosen. In accepting his terminology, Blair either believes Putin or is using it for his own purposes. The former is hard to support, the latter hard to stomach.
There is evidence that mujaheddin and terrorists have been fighting in Chechnya in recent years, and some Chechens have received training from them. But to argue that the Chechens and their cause are therefore terrorist is simply guilt by association.
There have been acts of terror by Chechens in the form of bus-hijackings and hostage-taking. Chechens, too, have been convicted for the bombings of apartment blocks in Moscow and southern Russia two years ago. Assuming they were to blame (and given Russia’s 1 percent acquittal rate and its campaign in Chechnya, there has to be some doubt about the justice of that judgment), are these acts of terrorism or terrible acts in a particularly ugly war?
The tactic was clearly terror, and the victims were innocents. But terror, it could be argued, underpins Russia’s tactics of destruction, torture, and massive “security sweeps.” If judged based on civilian deaths, displacement, and human-rights abuses, Russia appears the greater perpetrator of terror.
However it is painted, the terror inflicted by Chechens consists of isolated incidents. It is not a policy or a strategy, but a tactic occasionally used by a few. Instead, the Chechens’ battle--which, insofar as there is one leader, is led by Aslan Maskhadov, who was democratically elected president in 1997--is essentially a guerilla campaign. That is no surprise. The surprise is the Chechens’ willingness, particularly in the first war, to engage in pitched battles.
What’s more, a terrorist needs to be defined by his ends, not just his means. The Chechens’ struggle was not born of Islam, nor is it conducted in Islam’s name or principally waged by extremist “Wahhabi” fighters. The Chechens did not begin fighting Russians on Chechen soil to create a Taliban state or, like bin Laden, to roll back “infidels.” Unlike Al Qaeda, the Chechens’ fundamental goal is simple and their hope specific and political. The goal is to repel the Russian military offensive. The hope is for self-determination. Maskhadov has repeatedly called for peace talks. Until late this September, Putin had refused to talk with those "who are up to their elbows in blood."
Given that self-determination is the issue, the principled argument for democracies would be simple if a vote were possible in Chechnya: In a democracy, the shape of the state should be open to vote, so the Chechens should have a right to a referendum. The boggy ground in Chechnya is because democracy is absent. The mere absence of democracy cannot, perhaps, be a reason to hear an independence cause. That, instead, is a reason for championing human and minority rights. But the case for independence should surely be listened to if there is evidence that the worst excesses of state power are being visited on a people or if, for some reason, a huge proportion of the population is prepared to fight at all costs--death, exile, trauma, and sacrifice--for self-rule or self-determination.
In the case of Chechnya, there is compelling evidence of terrible Russian excesses against the population. And as for the Chechens’ willingness to fight and sacrifice, the years and reports on the ground make that clear. The Russians may downplay the scale of armed opposition--they claim to face just 3,000 to 5,000 fighters--and point to pro-Russian Chechens. However, even the pro-Moscow Chechen authorities have denounced Russian atrocities. Chechnya’s case for independence seems more compelling than the case put forward in the United States’s own Declaration of Independence.
SHAKING THE KALEIDOSCOPE
If the conclusions that Chechnya is a nation at war and has a strong claim to independence are broadly accepted, the principles of the democratic outside world suggest it has to say and do something.
War ends in victory or negotiation. The West should push for talks, assert the Chechens’ right to self-determination, and support the establishment of mechanisms that are as democratic and even-handed as the circumstances allow.
That would require the use of leverage. The West has financial and symbolic leverage. It does not use it. Past aid to Russia has come with next to no political or financial accountability. Russia has not been suspended from the OSCE and the Council of Europe, even though it could be on human-rights grounds. This is a policy of hands-off and usually mouths-shut engagement, albeit accompanied by concern and generosity. Its rules of engagement with Russia should be more normal. That would at least test the justification for Russia’s traditional leverage over the West--the fear that Russia is bellicose toward the West and that, without the West, Russia and its economy will implode.
Russia’s new leverage is the West’s need for Russian support, airspace, and bases in its battle against Afghanistan. This has increased the chance for quid pro quo, in which in exchange for cooperation, Russia might demand Western silence on Chechnya or assistance in rooting out support for Chechens.
However, Blair is right when he says, "The kaleidoscope has been shaken, the pieces are in flux, soon they will settle again.” Over the past weeks, Russia has been changing its stance on a variety of issues (including military cooperation) and tone on others (such as NATO’s eastward expansion). Putin has also said he would like broader cooperation with the West outside military and security issues. He even, on 26 September, gave a 72-hour ultimatum to Chechens to surrender weapons and then enter talks. His sincerity must be open to question, and the deadline has passed, but at least it seems back-channel lines of communication are opening.
This new openness and cooperation with the West--plus the offer of more--open up new areas for negotiation and compromise. So, rather than being bound to accept any terms offered by Russia, the West may gain new leverage and more means of influencing Russia. The same holds for Russia. In other words, a more normal relationship would give both Russia and the West more cards to play. And it should be the duty of those who talk of “good and evil,” “crusades,” and lay out moral visions to look closely at those cards--and to avoid the bloodiest, Chechnya.
Andrew Gardner is a contributing editor for TOL. The views expressed are his own.
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