Americans Must Not Ignore Russian Abuses in ChechnyaPARIS The curious personal response of President George W. Bush to
Vladimir Putin at their first meeting - that he felt he could see into
Mr. Putin's soul and know that he was good - was followed after Sept.
11
by a political alliance in the war against terrorism.
I say "curious" because a year ago, the expressed opinion of
Condoleezza
Rice, Mr. Bush's national security adviser, was that Russia continued
to
represent a threat to the West and, she added, particularly for the
European allies of the United States.
Now Russia has become one of the European allies of the United States,
at least so far as terrorism is concerned. Since Chechnya is a
terrorist
problem, according to Mr. Putin (he was, after all, elected president
two years ago with the assurance that he would settle the problem of
Chechen separatism), one can ask if the United States now is implicitly
allied with Russia on Chechnya.
As reports of death squads, torture, intimidation and exemplary
reprisals against noncombatants continue to arrive from Chechnya by way
of Russian human rights groups, the implications of Russia's way of
waging war against terrorism merit more concern in Washington than they
now receive.
The Russian journal Kommersant quotes a military spokesman who
justifies
"frequent attacks on innocents" by the necessity of making "inhabitants
understand that they suffer because of the activity of bandits" and
that
"if they were to help us, this would stop."
The Chechen issue has also inspired Mr. Putin to quash critical
reporting on the war. The independent news operations of two private
Russian television stations, NTV and now TV6 (both owned by "oligarchs"
at odds with the Russian president), have provoked officially inspired
civil lawsuits that closed down NTV and seem about to do the same to
TV6.
The space for independent or critical comment on the war now is down to
a single radio station and several limited-circulation publications.
Mr.
Putin meanwhile uses state television to solidify his image as a strong
leader and to consolidate his power.
He seems to be distancing himself from associates of Boris Yeltsin, the
man who plucked Mr. Putin from obscurity and sponsored his ascension to
the country's highest office.
The prospect this presents - of a reconstructed authoritarian Russia
with a politically subservient press and broadcast media - is not only
a
plausible outcome of events since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but
a logical one, since the version of democracy introduced into the
country after 1989 bestowed economic ruin and a criminal economy on the
country. Authoritarian reform under a young, dynamic leader has obvious
appeal.
If that leader sees his own interests served by collaboration with the
United States in its war against Islamic terrorism - in exchange for
U.S. acquiescence in his own program to restore Russian control or
influence in what formerly was the Soviet Union - the Bush
administration may consider the tradeoffs worthwhile.
That would be a mistake.
Washington has always tended to discount long-term interests, which in
this case concern much more than human rights. The challenge posed by
the current U.S. bid for power in resource-rich Central Asia, among
states formerly part of the Soviet Union, makes the Putin-Bush alliance
a convergence of short-term interests only. The context remains
long-term rivalry.
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