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Ramzan’s Era: The Making of a New Chechnya?

By Emil Souleimanov, special to Prague Watchdog

Ramzan’s chief goal in the following years became the constant solidifying of his power base in the country while earning confidence of Moscow strategists and making himself indispensable to them in key security matters. His recent ascent to the position of Chechnya’s prime minister can be viewed as the mere legalisation of Ramzan’s already existing standing as the most powerful man in Chechnya, and has been interpreted by some analysts as a more or less forced attempt to appease him, since he already wields so much power that failure to appoint him to a position commensurate with the influence he actually wields might drive him to oppose Moscow.

Apart from rigorous continuation of his father’s “struggle against terrorists and bandits”, the new prime minister has focused on “establishing order in the country”. Foremost, this would entail economic and “moral” order.

Kadyrov Jr has more or less successfully styled himself in the role of a steward and servant of his country who cares above all about the hardships and desires of his countrymen. Going at great lengths to cultivate his image as a Chechen devoted to his country, he has even been heard to have said: “If the [Chechen] people demand that we fight against Russia, we shall obey.”

For now, however, Kadyrov Jr definitely is not planning to start a war against Russia, at least strictly speaking. His agenda and the agenda of the Moscow-backed Chechen President Alu Alkhanov are more taken up with the continuation of specifics of economic policy that had already been instituted by Kadyrov Sr.

Typical in this connection is the long-running dispute about ownership of profits from the sale of Chechen crude oil. Moscow’s approach is typical in the question of the dividing of profits from the sale of Chechen crude oil. About two million tonnes of crude are extracted annually in Chechnya, representing at current prices at least 15 billion roubles. In spite of certain concessions to Grozny, the Kremlin is refusing to put the money from Chechen crude oil fully into the hands of Chechens. Instead, he tries to send part of that money back to the country through subsidies granted each year. This mechanism prevents the republic’s government from gaining control over a stable source of high revenues that could mean significant economic freedom. For the Kremlin, it is more advantageous to donate funds to Grozny every year, conditioned upon a necessary degree of loyalty.

Rebuilding Chechnya

Although the establishment system of embezzlement still remains in place, certain changes are noticeable: Ramzan really is trying to invest relatively sizeable amounts of money in rebuilding the country, especially Grozny and environs, after he declared this year as the year of renewal of Chechnya.

Thus, rubble is finally being cleared, roads, bridges and administrative buildings are being built and the number of so-called checkpoints is declining. After many promises, the "Severny" airport is expected to go back into operation this year. Even residential buildings are being repaired, mostly in the downtown area of the capital. People are even moved by such seemly trivial things that awaken nostalgia for pre-war Grozny like the rebuilding of the House of Fashion or the building of a public fountain downtown. Also being planned is the building of sports and entertainment complexes.

These are all public signs that life really is slowly but surely changing for the better and that the country is leaving the period of warfare behind, a period that once seemed to be never ending. Such signs are of inestimable value to ordinary Chechens. More and more money from Moscow is needed, of course, in order to realise this goal, which is exceptionally important for securing the favour of the Chechen people.

Ramzan is significantly engaged in the country’s “spiritual” life, too. Noteworthy are the quantity and contents of his most recent public statements, which often resonate ambivalently both in Chechen society and abroad. Recently, together with the country’s new mufti Sultan Mirzayev, he actually took part in the issuing of a fatwa [an official order by a Muslim religious leader] declaring jihad against “Wahhabism”, a phenomenon called a “plague of the 20th and 21st centuries.”

Ramzan has also shown a specific feel for Muslim solidarity by banning Danish citizens from the territory of the republic in connection with the scandal over caricatures of Mohammed. He was soon thereafter forced to withdraw that decision because of protests from Moscow.

Interestingly, he has launched an uncompromising campaign against societal vices, in the course of which he has appealed to the broader Chechen public. On television, he has protested that “Chechen youth no longer respect our national values like honour and dignity,” and he pointed out that “every man should know what his relatives are doing and how they are acting.” Prostitution, but also with drugs, alcoholism etc. became the target of Ramzan’s rage. Prostitution had previously been unheard of in Chechen society, and it is often associated with frivolous behaviour by women.

Besides that, over a period of ten days, he ordered the elimination of slot machines from the country. He recommended that women cover their hair, and he also spoke out for the introduction of polygamy. When it was found out that cell phones were being used to distribute risqué pictures, some of Kadyrov’s younger followers started using that as an excuse to carry out preventative “confiscation” of cell phones from young women in Grozny.

His latest calls for changing the borders of Chechnya with neighbouring republics have already raised protests in neighbouring republics and areas, mainly in Daghestan and the Stavropolskiy region.

Politicial scientist Lev Levinson summed up the purpose of Ramzan’s initiatives as follows: “Everything that we had been fighting against in Chechnya – Shari’a, rejection of the Russian legal system, the ineffectiveness of Russian [federal] laws on the territory of the republic – that is, everything that Dudayev had been accused of, and then Maskhadov after the negotiation of the Khasavyurt Agreement, all of this is now being done in this country with Moscow’s blessing.”

Admired and Feared

While Ramzan’s activities have often been scandalous, they have nonetheless brought him a certain popularity among ordinary Chechens, since he is supposed to have displayed thereby his decisiveness, strength, vigour and patriotism or to have publicly demonstrated his devotion to traditional values.

The young Kadyrov appeals to some older Chechens, while the strongly masculine traits of his personality, the success he has achieved at a relatively young age and his influence have, on the other hand, secured a certain admiration among young people, some of whom try to imitate him. He generally symbolises the effort of the vast majority of the population to live a new life in peace.

At the same time, Ramzan Kadyrov is a terrifying figure for many people. The stories about him are similar to the adventures of the American Wild West. According to some Chechens, he personally took part in torturing alleged separatists that had been arrested. Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya had already spoken out several years ago about Ramzan operating a “private prison” in his native village of Tsentoroy.

His Presidential Security Service, which had long been a core body of Kadyrov’s men, had about several hundred official members, but some sources claim the number was much higher. Its members had been recruited from among Kadyrov’s relatives, whose loyalty is considered absolute. The point is that to be a "Kadyrovite" is not only about one's affiliation with an institution, but also about personal commitment and faithfulness. Sending the Presidential Security Service's recruits into combat against real or fictitious separatists "bound them by blood." In this situation, only a group of likeminded brothers-in-arms provided one with security and certain income.

The number and determination of the fighters boosted Kadyrov's position both in the republic as well as outside its borders, including Moscow, which allowed him to pursue a freer course of action. Although the members of the Presidential Security Service were first moved to the Anti-Terror Center and then to the Chechen battalions "North" and "South", both under the command of the Russian Interior Ministry, the number of fighters loyal to him has not fallen.

Simultanously, Kadyrov tries to hold back the unlimited authority of federal troops in the country. From time to time he speaks out for a reduction of the Russian contingent. His knowledge of local realities and of his enemies has also allowed him from time to time to make moves against separatists or their sympathisers no less brutally than the Russian troops, but in a more targeted and less massive fashion.

Perhaps the greatest benefit of his policy has been the prospect of order returning to the country. His motto is “loyalty in exchange for a quiet life”. This is further strengthened by Ramzan’s clever media presentation and propaganda. Not a day goes by without him appearing on television, where he generously passes out textbooks to students, cars to the police, bricks to construction workers, needed equipment to physicians and encouraging counsel to the Chechen nation.

Chechnya is definitely getting a new face thanks to Kadyrov's policies, but the question is what kind of face it is.

PhDr. Emil Souleimanov, PhD, is a political scientist working at Charles University in Prague. He is a regular contributor to Prague Watchdog.

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