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CHECHNYA LINKS LIBRARY

December 20th 2008 · Prague Watchdog / Ruslan Nasipov · PRINTER FRIENDLY FORMAT · E-MAIL THIS · ALSO AVAILABLE IN: RUSSIAN 

The Chechens as they really are

The Chechens as they really are

(response to the article “The Chechens, but not as Solzhenitsyn knew them”)

By Ruslan Nasipov, special to Prague Watchdog

The author of the article “The Chechens, but not as Solzhenitsyn knew them” wondered why the Chechens are not showing civic courage and resisting the dictatorial regime – why are they so afraid, and where is their former love of freedom?

I will start with a banal statement: Chechens are ordinary people. Not heroes for the most part, but by no means cowards either. In order to understand what has happened to them, one needs to find out what they have had to undergo. And the two recent devastating military campaigns were not the worst of their ordeals.

Throughout all these years, the Chechens have not only waged war, but have also actively protested, organized anti-war demonstrations, peace marches, pickets and rallies. They have blocked off roads, military bases and checkpoints. Their protests were repeatedly broken up, and the leaders of the civic resistance were murdered – these leaders included not only men but also women: we should remember, for example, Malika Umazheva and Zura Bitiyeva, who were killed in 2002 and 2003, respectively.

It is no coincidence that after the death of Aslan Maskhadov the civic resistance in Chechnya began to fade. Firstly because the leaders of Western countries and various international institutions established to protect human rights finally stopped reacting to the events that were taking place in the republic. The Chechens no longer had anyone to whom they could issue appeals. Secondly, the ideology of armed resistance underwent significant changes – it was gradually taken over by supporters of radical Islam, who exchanged the national slogans for religious ones, and cut the ground from under the feet of the civic movement, too. The struggle for the republic’s independence, which was supported by a majority of the population, albeit with reservations, suddenly became irrelevant.

And thirdly, there was the policy of Chechenization. Its authors considered that adherence by Chechens to their national traditions was the main obstacle to bringing them to obedience. Being forced at some point in history to stop fighting, the Chechen people retired into themselves, “withdrew” to their traditions and customs, in large measure conserving them. Often, this led to the formation of an unofficial centre of power, in many cases represented by the Islamic clergy (the institution of sheikhs, for example). At no time did a parallel judicial system cease to function. Because of these characteristics the Chechens remained a united people, and this allowed them, time after time, despite all the hardships and the failures of their previous attempts, to assert their national rights as soon a new opportunity presented itself.

One should not ask whether there are scoundrels and decent people in Chechen society, but rather what place they occupy in it. And here much depends on the scale of values that is formed by the traditions and customs which persist. By changing those values, one can also change society, endow it with features which it formerly despised.

For example, any manifestation of narcissism, undue pride in oneself (in Chechen dozallash lelor) is something that used to be unequivocally condemned. We believe that even in a good cause one must not brag about one’s merits. Alms, too, must be given in secret, so that no one will doubt the sincerity of our intentions, and so that our desire to help will not be seen as showing off. However, one glance at the portraits of Chechnya’s leader which are on display throughout the republic on his birthday will show you the way in which the present regime flouts Chechen tradition.

Or take blood vengeance – to an outside observer, the Chechens’ least civilized custom. A closer examination reveals that it has preserved little of its medieval brutality. The Chechen version of it is merely a set of various mechanisms by means of which the aggrieved party can restore justice without resorting to further bloodshed. It also entails a system of compensation, the imposition of restrictions and new obligations on the offender’s relatives. The custom is reserved for only the most serious type of murder – those which are planned in advance and carried out in a brutal way. But the majority of cases are resolved with a full reconciliation of both parties.

Before the beginning of the second war this custom played a stabilizing role in Chechen society. The killing of an individual was a step undertaken only by a few, as the consequences for oneself and one’s relatives were too severe. The fact is that blood vengeance is strictly personalized, and accountability can only be sought from the person who directly committed the crime – or his next of kin, if his family intercedes on his behalf despite the obvious evidence. No mitigating factors are taken into account, particularly not political ones. If the offender was acting on orders to kill someone while serving in an official government agency or as a member of a paramilitary organization opposing the government, he is still solely responsible for what he has done.

But nowadays the custom of blood vengeance has been turned into something that is its complete opposite. It is no longer a matter between specific individuals, especially when one of then is a member of an armed group that operates in the service of the Russian state. His “team” must intercede on his behalf, rejecting the possible involvement of intermediaries which might lead to reconciliation. Moreover, such “vengeance” is accompanied by the violation of all the taboos: the safety of women and children, the sanctity of the home, the careful treatment of the dead man’s body in accordance with the norms of Islam. The rule that stipulates a “one to one” equality between individuals is ignored. A ritual custom has been turned into a bloodbath, where not only the guilty man may be killed, but also members of his family.

However, blood vengeance is really an extreme example. Let us turn to business. In earlier times the Chechens never even dreamt of the possibility that someone might make them give away part of their money to absolutely unknown recipients. But now racketeering has affected all the commercial outlets that still exist in the republic, all the business activity that goes on there. What is more, even state employees are forced to give up part of their income.

Within the nation a caste of men has been created who will stop at nothing, and for whom there is nothing sacred or immutable in the traditional norms and rules. And this has all been done for one purpose – to teach people to obey. To put it another way: the main task of Chechenization is the enslavement of people, endowing them with servile characteristics that are alien to them.

But are the policies being implemented in Chechnya today having any success? They are, in so far as there are those who lavish praise on the established regime. There were, however, people like this in other periods of history. I therefore believe it is still too early to say that the process has now gone too far, that it is acquiring an irreversible character. And the absence of protesters, of those who are willing to risk their lives, to denounce the government, is not indicative of anything at all in this respect.

The Chechen language has two terms which in different ways define the condition in which the republic’s inhabitants typically find themselves: kherar and larlush khilar. The first simply means the fear of something – terror, including the kind felt by animals. The second can be translated as “to be cautious about something, circumspect”. According to Chechen tradition there is nothing wrong with being cautious and keeping one’s head down in evil times. The days for rushing to expose one’s breast at the embrasure are past, and the world would not even notice our self-sacrifice.

All we can do is wait, deriving support from our traditions which include one that has long proclaimed a principal human virtue to be sobar khilar – the art of patience.


The picture is borrowed from the website Teptar.


(Translation by DM)

(T)



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