CHECHNYA LINKS LIBRARY

The Russian military in Kadyrov's Chechnya

By Ruslan Isayev, special to Prague Watchdog

The situation in Chechnya may be discussed differently by different observers. Everything depends on each person’s attitudes and objectives. Those who wish to see only the negative aspects will find them, just as those who are inclined to see the positive ones will find them, too. That is the very essence of the situation - it can be likened to an illness that has not been cured but merely contained, and can be viewed as a profound breakthrough in the Kremlin's North Caucasus policies.

It is unlikely that the "Ramzan Kadyrov" project for Chechnya was planned to run for a long period of time, and few people, even in their boldest hypotheses, talked of the possibility that he might become president. Originally, on many criteria, he did not fit that status. He cast himself less in the role of a politician, preferring instead to create around him the aura of a true Russian patriot. In this respect he has taken a much longer view than his late father, who permitted himself impartial remarks about the federal government. Strangely enough, the niche for a completely “loyal”  North Caucasus president who would swear allegiance to Russia has long been vacant. Kadyrov is happy with his image as the republic’s most pro-Russian president, and feels quite comfortable with it.

In Chechnya, Kadyrov’s opponents are less conspicuous than they are in Russia. At  least, no one makes negative remarks about him in public. But that does not mean there are none at all, merely that the people who recently criticized the current Chechen authorities cannot now afford to do so. And it makes no difference whether it is an ordinary resident or a Russian general.

If the majority of Chechnya’s civilian population, especially the most needy, unreservedly supports Kadyrov with all its heart, there is probably little enthusiasm for the young Chechen leader in the attitude of the military. Both sides, the Chechens and the Russian military, have reason not to trust each other.

Without a directive from the top Russian leadership, Chechnya would not have had its latest amnesty, which lured guerrillas into civilian life. The military does not trust the former guerrillas. A military man’s logic is simple and not difficult to comprehend: if a man has changed his principles once, then what will prevent him doing so a second time? The entire responsibility for those who have given up resistance and surrendered to the mercy of the current government is borne by Ramzan Kadyrov. With him the Chechen vertical of power begins and ends. Such a formula is a reliable safeguard against anyone going back to the resistance.

There is still a large military presence in Chechnya, and it continues to perform the same functions as before: the fight against so-called “international terrorists” and the maintenance of constitutional order in the republic. During the past two years, which have radically reversed the situation with the armed resistance, the numbers of servicemen have not greatly diminished. The military is still wary of the former guerrillas who have taken up the shovel instead of the sub-machine gun, and those guerrillas are nearly all under the covert control of the special services.

An important reason for the Russian military’s dislike of Kadyrov is based on financial factors. As he constructs his model of power in Chechnya, the young and energetic Kadyrov is not allowing anyone to use war for the purpose of massive self-enrichment as extensively as it was done in the past. No more do policemen and servicemen profiteer from the embezzlement of petroleum products and non-ferrous metals, the ransom of abductees, and the other spheres of black enterprise which became the second face of both wars.

The military will stand up en masse for one of its soldiers if he kills a Chechen civilian by mistake, in carrying out a criminal order, or worse, in a fit of pathological rage, or while drunk, as in the case of Budanov, Ulman and dozens of other criminals. The attitude taken by senior military officers to these criminal cases has clearly shown that the gap between Chechens and Russians is a very wide one. And the military always adamantly opposes decisions such as the one recently announced by Kadyrov, that in the near future all convicted Chechens will serve out their sentences at home in Chechnya.

 When Vladimir Shamanov, now former governor of Ulyanov oblast, shakes hands with the murderer and rapist Budanov and describes him as his friend,  when other generals raise their voices in the defence of Ulman, who shot and killed six unarmed villagers from the mountain settlement of Day in the Shatoysky district – all this gives rise as before to a strong hostility towards the Russian military. And although  Chechens in Russia are not the outcasts that they used to be, one still has the feeling that one is an ugly duckling rather than a beautiful swan. Yet there is hope that these phenomena may be residual ones.

Kadyrov has taken personal control of the investigation into the murder by Russian spetsnaz officers of women who were picking wild garlic near the village of Urdyukhoy in the Itum-Kalinsky district. He has made several statements about the Ulman case. He has long advocated that unneeded troops be withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya, which of course does not please the officers, for whom Chechnya is their only chance to improve their financial situation. For the higher officer caste, Chechnya represents an opportunity to make a career, and it is thanks to Chechnya that many generals have even managed to enter the political life of Russia without great effort.

But whichever way one looks at it, the basic index of trust in the Chechen government on the part of the federal centre is the size of the military presence in the republic.

However, the Russian military does not occupy a central place in the everyday realities of Chechen life. To be sure, Chechen and federal law enforcers still continue to carry out joint special operations together, but in the event of a successful outcome all the laurels go to the Chechens, even though it remains an undeniable fact that the current Chechen government derives its power from the military.

The military keeps out of sight, and stays in its bases. Only occasionally does it issue reminders of its power by moving around the republic in kilometre-long columns. Such scenes do not fail to make an impression. The only representative of the federal command who makes public appearances in Chechnya is Russian deputy interior minister Arkady Yedelev, who is head of the operational headquarters in the Chechen Republic. And even he is unlikely to feel good among his new “confederates”.  

It is perfectly possible for the patriotism of Chechens who are ready to defend Russia to be claimed in the form in which they are able to offer it – the art of war. But for this the decree of Russia’s commander-in-chief  alone is insufficient. What it requires is a simple call from Ramzan Kadyrov.

(MD/T)