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CHECHNYA LINKS LIBRARY

February 5th 2003 · Conflict Studies Research Centre / Marcel de Haas · PRINTER FRIENDLY FORMAT · E-MAIL THIS

The Use Of Russian Airpower in the Second Chechen War

Marcel de Haas, The Conflict Studies Research Centre, January 2003

Introduction

This paper describes part of the second Chechen conflict, which started in autumn 1999. The purpose of this document is not to provide a comprehensive study of this conflict. This study offers an analysis of the use of Russian airpower and the Chechen response to the use of military force, in order to assess the characteristics of this case of low-intensity conflict.

For pragmatic reasons I have divided the conflict into two parts. The first part comprises three military actions in Dagestan, from August-September 1999. The second part describes the second conflict in Chechnya, which started in September 1999 and still continues. In my assessment I will provide a comparison of the use of airpower between the present conflict and the first Chechen conflict (1994-1996) and seek to establish whether this type of conflict is a new phenomenon, a traditional form of insurgency or an example of conventional warfare.

Contents

The Use Of Russian Airpower In Dagestan (August-September 1999)
Background & Course Of The Conflict
Russian Grand Strategy: Actors & Objectives
Russian Military Strategy: Command & Control Structure
Russian Operational Level: Organisation Of Airpower
Russian Tactical Level: Application Of Airpower
Failures
Successes
Chechen Insurgents: Strategy & Operations
Subconclusions
Russia
The Chechen Insurgents

The Second Chechen Conflict (October 1999-Present)
Background
Course Of The Second Chechen Conflict
Russian Grand Strategy: Actors & Objectives
Russian Military Strategy: Command & Control Structure
Russian Operational Level: Organisation Of Airpower
Russian Tactical Level: Application Of Airpower
Tasks & Lessons Learned
Failures, Problems & Losses
Successes
Chechen Strategy & Operations
Subconclusions
Russia
Chechen

Comparison Of the Use Of Airpower In Both Chechen Conflicts (1994-1996 & 1999-date)
Structural Problems
Improvements

Characteristics
Russia
Chechen
Dominants Characteristics
Conclusions


The whole paper is available here (28 pages in PDF format).


Marcel de Haas is a Major, Royal Netherlands Air Force, Lecturer in International Relations & International Law, Royal Netherlands Military Academy.


Prague Watchdog thanks the author for the right to publish the paper.

(A/T)

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