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How We Fight Wars - and How They Do It

Vladimir Ryzhkov said in an exclusive interview with ITAR-TASS news agency that federal bodies, including the Security Council, "have done a great deal to counter terrorism in Russia and at the international level". Rushailo must have meant the developments in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Let us try to compare the results of the operations in these hot-spots.

There are numerous common features between the operations. The military campaign in Chechnya was preceded by explosions of apartment blocks in Moscow. The second Moscow explosion took place on September 11, 1999 - two years before the attacks on New York and Washington.

If these two tragedies in different parts of the world were really planned in one center, the masterminds behind the terrorist attacks are amazingly cunning and are unmatched organizers.

The Russian and American authorities moved in; and here the similarities end.

Moscow and other Russian cities were swept with overwhelming panic and fears of more explosions. The fears were fed by the authorities and the media. Mayor of Moscow Luzhkov urged city-dwellers to remain on guard and inform on suspicious neighbors (particularly if they are from the Caucasus). A campaign was initiated to brainwash the public into accepting the necessity and inevitability of a war on terrorists. The major enemy was indicated: Chechens. Not criminals of Chechen origin, but residents of Chechnya. All of them. Fortunately, a lot of Russians saw through the provocation, but 65% of poll respondents advocated an immediate launch of a counter-terrorism operation. The people's army set off for Chechnya again.

There was panic in the United States as well. Several Arabs were attacked and beaten in the first several days following the tragedy. Aware of the danger of ethnic and religious conflicts, the authorities took preventive measures. President George W. Bush addressed the nation urging it not to associate the tragedy with law-abiding Americans of Arab origin.

Situations in Afghanistan and Chechnya preceding troop deployment were nearly identical. Numerous Pushtu, Uzbek, and Tajik tribes were oppressed by the Taliban. Chechens were fed up with unemployment, absence of schools, inactivities of amorphous Maskhadov, and crimes committed by numerous Wahhabi. Essentially, they are the Taliban all over again, only using a different name.

America took its time to prepare the operation, disregarding sarcastic remarks from the international community. It conducted lengthy and difficult negotiations with the Northern Alliance, Dustum, Rabbani, Zahir Shah and thoroughly studied the Afghanis' mood. Diplomatic meetings with the leadership of Pakistan and some other Arab countries were organized.

Moscow did not bother with finesse. It got the consent of some regional leaders and presidents of republics of the Caucasus, and immediately sent its aviation against Russian cities and settlements. After World War II, no city in the world was probably devastated the way Grozny was.

The Americans used bombs too, but did it much better. They mostly hit targets, trying to avoid civilian casualties. A Russian correspondent who visited Kabul recently says that only a few buildings were destroyed there, precisely the ones that housed Taliban leaders. They were driven away with volunteers' support. Tenements in the capital of Afghanistan were preserved. Grozny has been razed to the ground with nothing to show for it.

When Kandahar was overrun (Taliban's last refuge), the Americans said a tank column would enter the city. Thirty armored vehicles, very few by Russian standards, but not one of them was burned.

Hundreds of tanks were once used in the attack on Grozny. More than half of them were destroyed, with their crews. Senior officers resign after fiascoes like that elsewhere - but not in Russia. Shortly afterwards Boris Yeltsin called Pavel Grachev the best defense minister.

Before entering Kabul, Americans showered illiterate Afghanis with leaflets assuring them of their love and friendship toward the people they wanted liberated from the hateful regime. Literate Russians of Chechen origin never saw any leaflets from the federal government. Dislike bordering on hatred was the only feeling representatives of the united federal group experienced with regard to the locals. Even though the military knew that success was impossible without the locals' trust.

As for the separatists, the federal troops did not mince words. The separatists were asked to surrender, and that was that. There were no volunteers. When some did, they either disappeared - or their mutilated bodies were later discovered in a ditch somewhere.

It is hard to imagine American GIs looting Afghani villages for rugs, furniture, home appliances, and even home-made preserves. It is hard to imagine a US Army colonel abducting an Afghani girl, raping her, and murdering her - saying she might have been a Taliban sniper. He would have been tried and convicted. Meanwhile, in Russia, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov publicly admits that he supports Colonel Budanov.

Chechnya has an Osama bin Laden of its own. He is Shamil Basayev. Chechnya has its own Mullah Omar. He is Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. Despite the difference in size of the territory, the Americans are much closer to capturing bin Laden and Omar than Russia is to arresting Basayev and Khattab. The explanation is simple. We have been looking in the wrong places and in the wrong way. Or have not been looking at all. It follows that Rushailo should not exaggerate his country's contribution to the war on international terrorism.