Is the new US policy toward Chechnya justifiable or practical?The tragic events of September 11th have prompted a change in US policy towards the war in Chechnya. Now the US needs the cooperation of Russia to fight the new war against international terrorism - however defined. In particular, Washington has to be sure that Russia will not oppose its involvement in Central Asia, specifically in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the two former Soviet Union states that border Afghanistan. But what will be the significance and outcome of this change?
Although many analysts say that the Chechens will be victims of the shift in policy, that is not yet obvious. What is clear is that from the US point of view the Chechens are divided into two camps: a "legitimate and responsible political leadership" aiming to protect the "legitimate interests of the Chechen people", and "international terrorists". The former have been urged to cut all links with the latter camp, while Russia has been encouraged to engage in a political dialogue with the "legitimate" camp. But how justified are those definitions?
It is obvious that the second description refers to the forces led by the Arab commander Khattab. His presence and military activities in Chechnya, as well as the presence on the Chechen side of a few dozen fighters of non-Chechen origin, are undeniable, but the role they play has been grossly overestimated. While extremist acts have occurred, ostensibly in the name of the Chechen cause, they have taken place outside Chechen borders and have been rejected by President Maskhadov's legally elected government. It has never been claimed they were in any way organized or approved by the legitimate Chechen military fighting the Russians inside Chechnya.
Nor has anyone ever made any plausible allegation, let alone produced any evidence, that links Khattab himself to terrorist acts anywhere in the world. Fighting Russian troops in Chechnya makes him no more a terrorist than fighting against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan did more than a decade earlier. This lack of evidence, however, is considered irrelevant in the face of the US accusation of terrorism. Justifiability has not been a feature of world politics since before the time of Machiavelli and Richelieu.
Indeed Machiavelli taught us that, in justifying 'the actions of all men, and especially of princes, where there is no impartial arbiter one must consider only the final result'. Similarly, Richelieu's principle raison d'etat argued that what matters is whether a policy brings about a given goal, not the policy's moral justifiability.
If, therefore, for the sake of argument we ignore issues of morality, then practicability at least should be a factor. Are the new US demands being made of the Chechens practical? Do they serve both US and Chechen interests, and can the Chechen side satisfy them? The answer is arguably no.
The change in policy has evidently helped Washington to bring Russia into the US-led coalition against terrorism, and may therefore have served US interests. However, this is a shortsighted view. A vital component of current US strategy is to avoid at all costs the portrayal of the newly launched campaign as a war against Islam. If the US is to succeed it has to avoid a clash between the West and Islam, and it therefore needs a political solution in Chechnya almost as much as peace in the Middle East - a solution which would provide evidence that there is no such ideological war being waged.
The level of diplomatic support, albeit qualified, that the US was able to give Chechnya until recently was highly valued. It seemed a beacon of fairness and hope in comparison to what was felt to be the hypocrisy and double standards of the European powers, which have been willing to ignore Russia's crimes in Chechnya. Now, however, the justifiability of US policy toward the war in Chechnya can only be judged by its final outcome. Will the US help bring much-needed peace to the Chechen people, or will it simply give Russia carte blanche to continue with crimes against humanity that rank alongside the worst in Europe since 1945?
For now, no one can tell. There are some indications that the US is prodding Russia to the negotiating table with Chechen President Maskhadov, but so far there have been no tangible results. Russian troops continue to commit war crimes in Chechnya on a systematic basis. The small hope of peace that emerged with President Putin's earlier statement has almost disappeared thanks to Russia's purposely unacceptable demands. This is time for the US to increase pressure on Russia and make the hope of peace more than an illusion.
Much in this process depends on whether the Chechen side can deliver what the US demands. Forced to fight against numerically and technologically far superior Russian troops, the Chechen leadership would be foolish to open a second front against extremist elements in Chechnya. The well known maxim "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" is as much true in the Russian-Chechen war as it is in the American war against Bin Laden and his terrorist network.
The Chechens can afford to face additional enemies only if they are given tangible help in the form of peace with Russia - and concrete American guarantees that Russia will not attack from the rear - so that they can wage war on elements both the US and the Chechens themselves want to expel from Chechnya.
The US must understand the complexities of Chechnya's situation: without peace, nothing else that is demanded can be achieved. If it cannot help Chechnya achieve peace first of all, its policy will be ineffective and all sides will come out losers. The Chechens will have to face further isolation, leading to nothing but more war and misery. The US determination to distance its new military campaign from a "war against Islam" will become less convincing, as will its mission to apply principles of justice and freedom without geographical limits.
Russia too will lose, since this long, bloody and unwinnable war in Chechnya, a war that destroys not only Chechen but Russian lives and families, is not in Russia's long term interests either. The only interests such a war could ever serve are those of a faction among Russian generals and the nation's hard-line politicians.
PW note: The author is the press secretary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.
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