Summary
Georgia entered the Council
of Europe in April 1999 as the first of the South Caucasian countries.
The two conflicts on its territory – in Abkhazia and in South Ossetia –
have not been solved yet and the country has also been affected by the
conflict in the Chechen Republic. The peace-keeping and law enforcement
efforts taken by Georgia and the Russian Federation on their respective
territory along their common border must be pursued further.
Membership with the Council
of Europe commits all member States to collective responsibility towards
democracy, human rights and the rule of law and hence implies refraining from
the use of force among member States and the settlement of disputes in
accordance with international law.
The objective of this report
is to formulate recommendations to the authorities of Georgia, to other
countries concerned as well as to the Council of Europe and its member States,
with a view to helping to find a political solution to the conflicts within
Georgia and reinforcing the climate of confidence in the whole Caucasus
region. The Council of Europe must intensify its involvement in the Caucasus
and work actively with the countries concerned in order to give new impetus to
the peace and stabilisation processes in the region.
I.
Draft recommendation
1.
Membership with the Council of Europe commits all member States to collective
responsibility towards democracy, human rights and the rule of law and hence
implies refraining from the use of force among member States and the
settlement of disputes in accordance with international law;
2.
Frozen conflicts in the Caucasus, including those where active fighting has
stopped, continue to represent a danger to stability, since the resumption of
violence can never be excluded;
3.
The Assembly considers that the Council of Europe must intensify its
involvement in the Caucasus and work actively with the countries concerned in
order to give new impetus to the peace and stabilisation processes in the
region;
4.
The peace-keeping and law enforcement efforts taken by Georgia and the Russian
Federation on their respective territory along their common border must be
pursued further;
5.
Article 51 of the UN Charter and Resolution
1269 (1999) of the UN Security Council on international terrorism as well
as Resolution
1368 (2001) of the UN Security Council of 12 September 2001 do not
authorise the use of military force by the Russian Federation or any other
State on Georgian territory;
6.
The Assembly stands ready to offer good offices and a platform for dialogue
between parliamentarians from Georgia and the Russian Federation in this
context;
7.
The Assembly encourages the development of the work of the special
representative of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in Tiblissi,
to be appointed in order to facilitate Council of Europe assistance to the
Georgian authorities and co-operate with other international organisations
present;
8.
The Assembly calls on the authorities of Georgia:
i.
to re-affirm its commitment to solve the conflicts on its territory only by
peaceful means and, in this connection, to refrain from any action in direct
or indirect support to forces inclined to solve these conflicts by force;
ii.
to take decisive measures with a view to demonstrating its resolution to
continue democratic reforms in the country, in particular in the light of
the local elections of June 2002;
iii.
to pursue their efforts towards substantial progress as regards the
implementation of the commitments, which Georgia accepted when it joined the
Council of Europe;
iv.
to co-operate with all States concerned as regards the fight against
terrorism and to take the necessary measures to ensure the rule of law on
all parts of its territory, including the Pankissi valley;
v.
to take strict measures with a view to combating corruption and criminal
activities;
vi.
to bring transparency to the distribution of foreign aid with a view to
ensuring that autonomous regions receive a fair part of it;
vii.
to intensify the dialogue both at governmental and parliamentary levels with
the Russian Federation with a view to seeking solutions to the issues, which
create tensions in the relations between these two countries;
9.
The Assembly appeals to Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaders to abandon their
harsh positions and accept to engage in serious negotiations about the status
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia within Georgia;
10.
The Assembly calls on the authorities of the Russian Federation:
i.
to refrain from any action or declarations, which might interfere in the
internal affairs of Georgia or violate the sovereignty and the territorial
integrity of Georgia, in particular from launching any military action on
Georgian territory as expressed by the President of the Russian Federation
on 11 September 2002;
ii.
to refrain from any unilateral measures affecting Georgia and its citizens,
in particular as regards Abkhazia and South Ossetia, without prior
discussion with and the agreement of the Georgian authorities, including in
the fields of economic assistance and the freedom of movement of persons and
goods, in particular with respect to visas, customs and passport issues;
iii.
to intensify the dialogue both at governmental and parliamentary levels with
Georgia with a view to seeking solutions to the issues, which so far have
created tensions in the relations between these two countries;
iv.
to remove their military bases in Georgia as soon as possible in accordance
with the agreement reached with Georgia;
11.
The Assembly recommends to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe:
i.
to encourage all action by the Secretary General to resolve the security
issues on a multilateral basis in accordance with the objectives of the
Council of Europe;
ii.
to co-operate in the context of the United Nations conflict settlement
mechanisms in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with the European Union, given the
economic and technical assistance which the European Union is providing to
facilitate the peace process;
iii.
to co-operate with the OSCE with regard to their monitoring action in
Georgia and provide the necessary means for a Council of Europe
participation in this monitoring action;
iv.
to intensify its assistance programmes to Georgia with a view to
strengthening democratic reforms;
v.
to initiate, with all the parties and countries concerned, a discussion on
the perspectives for an increased regional co-operation.
II.
Explanatory memorandum by the Rapporteur
A.
Introduction
1.
The Caucasus region, situated between Europe and Asia, has historically been
an area where European and Asian civilisations, nations and religions have
been bordering each other and, at times, have been in conflict with each
other.
2.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, three independent countries –
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – re-emerged in the South Caucasus
region. Unfortunately, this period was also marked by a series of bloody
conflicts: in Nagorno-Karabakh, in Abkhazia and in South Ossetia, as well as
in the Russian North Caucasus, in particular in the Chechen Republic.
3.
At present, open hostilities have mostly ceased in the South Caucasus, but
occasional fighting does break out. In the Chechen Republic, a “guerrilla”
war is still going on.
4.
These conflicts have destabilised the region. Many of thousands of
people are dead or wounded. There are hundreds of thousands of refugees
and displaced people in the region, who have not returned to their homes.
5.
There has no political solution been found, as yet, to any of these
conflicts. They continue to represent a potential danger to the
stability of the whole region as well as a major obstacle to regional
co-operation and economic development.
6.
Georgia, in the heart of the Caucasus region and situated on the main transit
routes between Europe and Asia, has been considerably affected by these
regional developments. Without any exaggeration, we can say that the stability
of the region depends to a large extent on the stability in Georgia.
7.
Georgia entered the Council of Europe in April 1999 as the first of the South
Caucasian countries. The two conflicts on its territory - in Abkhazia
and in South Ossetia – have not been solved yet and the country has also
been affected by the conflict in the Chechen Republic. Georgia enjoys
good relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, its two South Caucasus neighbours,
but there are major tensions in therelationship with the Russian Federation.
8.
In my report, I concentrate on the issues inside Georgia, which, because of
their regional and even global ramifications, have an impact on the stability
of the entire region. These issues are, mainly, the conflicts in Abkhazia and
in South Ossetia and the consequences of the conflict in Chechnya. When
examining these problems, I take into consideration both the internal
political situation in the country as well as the relations with its
neighbouring countries, in particular the Russian Federation.
9.
The objective of this report is to formulate recommendations to the
authorities of Georgia, to other countries concerned as well as to the Council
of Europe and its member States, with a view to helping to find a political
solution to the conflicts within Georgia and reinforcing the climate of
confidence in the whole Caucasus region.
10.
I also believe that this approach will put a distinctive line between this
report and the on-going work of the Monitoring Committee.
B.
Visit to Georgia on 27 - 30 April 2002
11.
At the invitation of the Parliament of Georgia, I visited the country from 27
- 30 April 2002. I was accompanied by Mr Petr Sich, Co-Secretary of the
Political Affairs Committee. The programme of the visit appears in
Appendix I.
12.
During the visit, we met parliamentary and governmental representatives
concerned, representatives of the United Nations and of the OSCE missions in
Georgia, representatives of humanitarian agencies – the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), Ambassadors of the Council of Europe member States and NGOs.
13.
With the kind assistance of the OSCE, we visited Shatili on the
Russian-Georgian border, one of the bases of the OSCE Border Monitoring
Operation, and also South Ossetia. Due to the lack of time, we could not visit
Abkhazia.
14.
I wish to thank very sincerely the Georgian Parliament as well as the OSCE
Mission to Georgia for the excellent organisational arrangements for the visit
and for their hospitality.
15.
My visit coincided with that of the EU-Georgia Parliamentary Co-operation
Committee (of the European Parliament). We carried out jointly both
above-mentioned visits and I should also like to mention the excellent working
relations between the two delegations.
C.
Conflict in Abkhazia
16.
The armed conflict between the Abkhaz separatists and the Georgian authorities
broke out in 1992. A cease-fire was signed in May 1994. The
agreement provides for the deployment of the Commonwealth of Independent
States’ Peacekeeping Forces (CIS PKF) in the conflict area and for that of
unarmed UN observers (UNOMIG). As a result of the conflict, around
250.000 people, mostly of Georgian origin, have been driven out of Abkhazia.
17.
For the time being, discussions on the political settlement seem to be in a
deadlock. They take place in a so called “UN led Geneva peace process”.
The UN has now prepared a proposal on the distribution of competences between
Abkhazia and the central authorities. The latter hope that this document will
provide a basis for the settlement, but the Abkhaz side does not seem to
abandon its position of principle that the reunification is only possible if
Georgia and Abkhazia are treated as equal entities. Lately, Abkhazia has
renewed its insistence on the independence, while the international community
has not recognised such an attempt.
18.
The below-described events of last autumn in the Kodori valley nearly ruined
the peace process and even threatened to lead to the resumption of the armed
conflict.
19.
It is claimed that, last autumn, the Georgian authorities deployed or, at
least, facilitated the deployment of anti-Abkhaz fighters in the Kodori valley
in Abkhazia, which gives direct access to Sukhoumi, capital of Abkhazia.
Abkhazia called it a breach of the 1994 cease-fire agreement. The UNOMIG
demanded the withdrawal of these fighters.
20.
In April 2002, the Georgian authorities declared that the fighters had left
the valley. A subsequent unannounced deployment of the CIS peacekeeping
forces in Kodori, whose alleged intention was to check if the withdrawal had
effectively taken place, led to a serious deterioration in the relations
between Russia and Georgia. At the end of April, the joint UNOMIG/CIS
PKF resumed patrolling in Kodori. In August, land mines were installed in the
upper Kodori valley by some 400 fighters. It seems that meanwhile the
situation has deteriorated severely in the Kodori valley and UNOMIG issued a
statement on 11 September 2002 expressing serious concern in this respect
and calling on both sides to return to the status quo of before the fights of
last summer as well as to refrain from unilateral actions and inflammatory
rhetoric which would further exacerbate the situation.
21.
Tensions still persist between Russia and Georgia regarding the role of the
CIS PKF. The Georgian side is proposing a change in their mandate, which the
Abkhaz side refuses. It should be mentioned that the Georgian Parliament
asked, last autumn, for an immediate withdrawal of these forces.
Nevertheless, the UNOMIG says that as its own observers are unarmed, the joint
patrol with the CIS PCK is a necessary condition for the UNOMIG’s observers
to function. Meanwhile, Georgia agreed to an extension of the CIS PCK mandate
until 31 December 2002, which allowed the UN Security Council to extend
accordingly the UNOMIG mandate.
22.
Mr Aslan Abashidze, representative of the President of Georgia (at the same
time the President of Adjara, a Georgian autonomous region) declared on
20 June 2002 that the settlement of the conflict between Abkhazia
and Georgia is impossible without Russia. He welcomed the role of the
Russian forces deployed in Abkhazia under a CIS mandate and considered that
Tbilissi and Sukhoumi should agree on a new status for Abkhazia.
23.
As a result of the above events, perspectives for a settlement seem to be more
remote now than at the beginning of 2002. A lot of energy had to be
devoted to the crisis management rather than to the process of seeking a
political settlement.
D.
Conflict in South Ossetia
24.
The fighting between the South Ossetian separatists and the central
authorities ended in late 1992 with the signature of a cease-fire
agreement. A Joint Peace Force, composed of Georgian, Ossetian and
Russian army units, has been put in place. Furthermore, a Joint Control
Commission (JCC) is working, composed of Georgian, Russian, North Ossetian and
South Ossetian representatives, with representatives of the UNHCR, the
European Commission (EC) and the OSCE. The JCC is dealing with military
and security issues, economic rehabilitation, refugees and displaced people.
25.
Since 1996, when the first stage of the stabilisation period ended and the
elementary conditions of security were put in place, the tensions have
decreased. Security has further improved and the free movement of people
between Georgia and South Ossetia has been, in principle, guaranteed.
Nevertheless, these considerable improvements have not been sufficient to
bring about a political solution. The main reason seems to be that the
South Ossetian leadership wants to continue its “de facto”
independence and its preferential relations with Russia.
26.
The new South Ossetian leader, Mr Eduard Kokoyty, who became “President”
of South Ossetia after the internationally not recognised “elections” held
in December 2001, reiterated its commitment to the peaceful solution of the
conflict but insisted on the following conditions:
-
official Georgian “apology for the past atrocities committed” during the
conflict;
-
economic compensation for damages inflicted;
-
contribution of Tbilissi to the return of refugees and displaced persons;
-
economic contribution of Tbilissi to the rehabilitation of the conflict
zones.
27.
Furthermore, he appears to set a condition to the settlement process by
requiring that South Ossetia must be able to continue its friendly relations
with Russia. Citizens of South Ossetia are, for example, exempted from
visas, which Russia has introduced for Georgia. Abkhazia has been granted the
same exemption. We were also told that abouthalf of the South Ossetian
population held Russian citizenship.
28.
At a press conference given in Moscow at the end of May 2002, Mr Kokoyty
stated that he would continue to strive for the reunification with North
Ossetia within the Russian Federation. He said that only close
co-operation with the Russian Federation would prevent military action by
Georgia against South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
29.
In May 2002, the so-called “Parliament” of South Ossetia called on the
international community to recognise “the independence of the State created
by the South Ossetian people on the basis of their right to self-determination”.
The international community has not recognised this act and hence does not
regard South Ossetia as an independent State.
30.
Some economic reasons may also underline the reluctance of South Ossetia to
move further on the issue of a political settlement. South Ossetia has
become an important market place and a point of transit for goods from Georgia
(and probably the whole South Caucasus region) towards Russia. We were
told that the goods transiting to Russia via South Ossetia are submitted to a
3% tax, while customs duties elsewhere in Georgia are much higher (around
25%). It is often claimed that this trade, or a part of it, is under the
control of criminal structures connected to the rest of Georgia and to
Russia. It is also alleged that a part of the money obtained from this
trade serves to support political forces willing to protect it.
31.
Despite occasional tensions, I consider that, contrary to Abkhazia, there is
only a very limited danger that the armed conflict will resume in South
Ossetia. On the other hand, the South Ossetian leaders are probably
willing to continue the existing “status quo”, paying only a lip service
to the peace settlement efforts, while striving to keep their political and
commercial independence.
32.
Unfortunately, slow progress by the Georgian authorities on some crucial
issues such as the restoration of the South Ossetia autonomous region status
and the law on restoration of housing and property rights of refugees and
internally displaced people, as well as occasional manifestations of
sympathies towards the policies of Mr Gamsakhurdia, former President of
Georgia known for his strong nationalistic positions, may give arguments to
South Ossetia leaders to delay the settlement process.
33.
It should also be pointed out that some statements made in Moscow hinting at a
possible unification of South and North Ossetia with the support Russia may
aggravate the tensions and keep alive unrealistic hopes.
E.
Consequences of the conflict in the Chechen Republic
34.
When the current stage of the conflict in the Chechen Republic started in
1999, the authorities of the Russian Federation accused Georgia of sheltering
Chechen fighters and asked the Georgian authorities to authorise the Russian
army to operate in Georgia to fight Chechen “terrorists”.
35.
Georgia denied these accusations and called upon the OSCE to observe and
report movements across the border between Georgia and the Chechen Republic of
the Russian Federation.
36.
In December 1999, the OSCE Permanent Council extended the mandate of its
mission in Georgia to meet this request. The monitors, who are unarmed,
operate from three bases: Shatili, Girevi and Omalo. In December 2001,
the mandate was extended to include monitoring the Ingush section of the
border between Georgia and the Russian Federation. A base was
established in Sno.
37.
The most serious concerns have been expressed about the presence of Chechens
in the Pankissi Valley, situated around 35 kilometres north of Tbilissi.
This valley is generally considered as a largely lawless area, mostly
controlled by criminals and fighters. The Georgian authorities maintain
that the Chechens, who live in the valley (possibly around 8.000 people), are
refugees. The Russian authorities claim that the valley is used by
Chechen fighters as a safe haven and a base for their operations in Russia.
38.
Last year, the Georgian authorities accused Russia of bombarding its territory
on the pretext of fighting Chechen terrorists. Russia strongly denied
these accusations.
39.
In the spring of 2002, the US government declared that Al-Qaida terrorists
were hiding in the Pankissi Valley. The Georgian government accepted the
presence of some 200 US instructors to help train the Georgian anti-terrorist
units.
40.
During the meeting with OSCE observers, I was told that while movements of
smaller groups across the border with Russia could not be excluded (the border
is in the mountains and difficult to survey), no major groups were spotted
crossing the border. The OSCE is keeping a list of border incidents, but
they are relatively few and of minor importance. Furthermore, the border
is practically closed by snow during winter times.
41.
In these circumstances, it does not seem likely that the Pankissi valley
serves in any meaningful manner as an active base for the Chechen
fighters. It is, nevertheless, impossible to claim that there has not
been a presence of Chechen fighters there. The lawless situation in
Pankissi undoubtedly represents a security threat both to Georgia and to
Russia. Both countries have an interest in collaborating in order to
solve this situation, while fully respecting the principles of sovereignty and
territorial integrity. I welcome the declared willingness of the
Georgian government to restore the rule of law in the Pankissi valley
42.
However, the situation has been severely aggravated by the declaration of the
President of the Russian Federation of 11 September 2002, which contained the
threat of using unilateral military action based on Article 51 of the UN
Charta against suspected terrorists on Georgian territory, but also expected
Georgian agreement on joint efforts during the next CIS Summit on 7 October
2002. In response hereto, the Georgian President invited on 13 September a
monitoring mission to the Pankissi valley by the OSCE including Russian
participation.
43.
It should also be mentioned that the South Ossetian leaders expressed fears
that the Georgian government could use the resources and know-how provided by
the US in the fight against terrorism in order to “re-conquer” South
Ossetia and Abkhazia by force. It would be helpful if clear statements
were made by Georgia and the USA in order to dispel these fears.
F.
Internal political situation in Georgia
44.
Georgia’s political landscape changed substantially last autumn. The Citizen’s
Union of Georgia, which supported President Shevarnadze and had a comfortable
majority of 2/3 in the Parliament, split into several fractions. There
is now no government majority and it seems that ad hoc coalitions are
formed on an “issue by issue” basis. As a result of this
fragmentation, the role of the President has become more difficult.
45.
We were told that, in the current circumstances, it was relatively difficult
to obtain a consensus on a number of issues related to the internal
politics. Nevertheless, on foreign policy issues, the majority of the
Parliament supported the positions of the President (for example during the
Kodori Valley crisis).
46.
At the time of the visit, the country was preparing for the local elections,
which took place on 2 June 2002. A delegation of the Congress of Local
and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE) of the Council of Europe, which
observed these elections “noted with regret that the hopes for a fair
electoral process were dampened by inappropriate preparations and questionable
decisions by the authorities”. The authorities were “unable to
provide for the basic conditions for electing genuine democratic local
government”.
47.
In this connection, I have received an appeal from members of the Parliament
denouncing restrictions imposed by the authorities on the activities of
certain political forces opposed to the President.
48.
Georgian military forces have been provided with training and assistance by
military personnel from the USA since May 2002 in order to fight international
terrorism. This effort can only be successful through a joint action by the
international community.
49.
It is not my task to examine in detail the internal political situation in the
country. Nevertheless, the difficulties of the current period do not benefit
the solution of the conflicts in Georgia. It can now be difficult for
the authorities to take decisions, which may be necessary in this
respect. Furthermore, the democratic shortcomings in today’s Georgia
can make the inhabitants of the independent-minded regions more reluctant to
proceed with the reunification.
G.
Relations with the Russian Federation
50.
Throughout this report, Russia has often been mentioned as a key player with
regard to the solution to the conflicts in Georgia. The Georgian
authorities often claim that Russia is using the conflicts in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, as well as that in Chechnya, as a means of maintaining its
influence in Georgia and in the South Caucasus region.
51.
The problem of the Russian military bases in Georgia is another difficult
question for both countries. The Georgian authorities have requested
Russia to remove these bases, but despite an agreement in principle, no
deadlines for the withdrawal have been agreed as yet concerning the two
remaining bases.
52.
Relations with the Russian Federation have also suffered by the Russian
authorities’ granting of citizenship to residents in Georgia and the related
issuance of Russian passports to persons living there.
53.
As rapporteur, I consider that there is a lot of room for improvement in the
relations between Georgia and Russia. Unless there is, in both
countries, a genuine political will to understand each others’ positions and
problems and to act jointly in good faith to seek solutions, there cannot be
either substantial progress on the settlement of the conflicts in Georgia or a
lasting stability in the Caucasus region.
54.
In this respect, the Parliaments of both countries have an important role to
play. I call on them to continue and intensify their dialogue,
including within the framework of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe.
H.
Conclusions
55.
Conflicts, including those where active fighting has stopped, continue to
represent a danger to stability, since the resumption of violence can never be
excluded. Furthermore, they represent a leverage, which some forces keep using
to promote their own interests, which may not always coincide with the
interests of the Caucasian peoples.
56.
I regret to conclude that perspectives for a lasting political settlement of
the conflicts dealt with in this report are not any better than they were some
years ago. There is no indication, at this moment, that the South
Ossetian and Abkhaz leaders are willing to accept, in the foreseeable future,
the re-integration of their regions into Georgia. On the other hand, the
internal political problems in Georgia appear to weaken the negotiation
position of the Georgian authorities.
57.
In these circumstances, the Council of Europe must intensify its involvement
in the Caucasus and work actively with the countries concerned in order to
give new impetus to the peace and stabilisation processes in the region.
The recommendations of the Assembly should help to achieve these objectives.
APPENDIX I
Programme of the visit of
the Rapporteurto Georgia
(27-30 April 2002)
|
Saturday,
27 April 2002 |
|
|
|
|
|
05:05
|
Arrival
at Tbilisi Airport
|
|
09:45
|
Departure
for OSCE Tbilisi office
|
|
10:00
|
Meeting
with H.E. Jean Michael Lacombe, Head of the OSCE Mission in Georgia
|
|
11:00
|
Flight
to the Georgian – Russian border (OSCE Monitoring Base in Shatili)
|
|
16:00
|
Return
to Tbilisi
|
|
18:00
|
Meeting
with NGOs
|
|
19:00
|
Departure
for State Chancellery
|
|
19:15
|
Meeting
with Mr. Irakli Machavariani, Envoy of the President for Settlement of
Conflict in the Tskhinvali Region (South Ossetia)
|
|
Sunday,
28 April 2002
|
|
|
|
|
|
11:00
|
Departure
for the Tskhinvali Region (South Ossetia) with representatives of the
OSCE Mission
|
|
12:00
|
Arrival
in Gori
|
|
|
Visit
of small farmer enterprise
|
|
13:00
|
Departure
for Tskhinvali
|
|
14:00
|
Arrival
in Tskhinvali, meetings
|
|
21:00
|
Informal
dinner with Georgian Parliamentarians
|
|
|
|
|
Monday,
29 April 2002
|
|
|
|
|
|
09:50
|
Departure
for MFA
|
|
10:00
|
Meeting
with Mr. George Burduli,
First Deputy Foreign Minister
|
|
10:55
|
Departure
for the Georgian Parliament
|
|
11:00
|
Meeting
with the President of the Parliament Mrs Nino Burdjanadze
|
|
12:00
|
Meeting
with Mr. Dieter Boden,
Special Representative of Secretary General of the UN
|
|
13:00
|
Departure
for the German Embassy
|
|
13:15
|
Meeting
with Ambassadors of Council of Europe member States
|
|
14:45
|
Departure
for the UNHCR Tbilisi office
|
|
15:00
|
Meeting
with Mr. Patrick TEZIER, Deputy Head of UNHCR c/o
|
|
15:45
|
Departure
for the ICRC Tbilisi office
|
|
16:00
|
Meeting
with Mr. Martin AMACHER, Deputy Head of ICRC c/o
|
|
16:45
|
Departure
for the State Chancellery
|
|
17:00
|
Meeting
with Mr. Avtandil Djorbenadze,
State Minister
|
|
17:50
|
Departure
for the Ministry of Interior
|
|
18:00
|
Meeting
with Mr. Shofa ASATIANI, Deputy Minister of Interior
|
|
19:15
|
Meeting
with Mr. Zurab ZHAVANIA, member of the Georgian delegation of the PACE
|
|
20:15
|
Departure
for the “Sachashnike” restaurant
|
|
20:30
|
Dinner
hosted by the President of the Parliament Mrs Nino BURDJANADZE
|
|
|
|
|
Tuesday, 30 April
2002 |
|
|
|
|
|
04:30
|
Departure
for Tbilisi airport
|
|
05:45
|
Flight
to Vienna
|
Commission
chargée du rapport :
commission des questions politiques
Renvoi en
commission : Doc. 8958,
Renvoi 2569, 26.01.01
Projet de
recommandation adopté par la commission le
23.06.02, avec 4 voix contre et 3 abstentions
Membres de
la commission : Jakic
(Président), Feric-Vac
(Vice-Présidente),
Spindelegger (Vice-Président), Aguiar,
Aliyev, Andican, Atkinson, Azzolini,
Bakoyianni (remplaçant :
Liapis), Behrendt,Berceanu,
Bergqvist, Bianco (remplaçant :
Danieli), Björck, Blaauw,
Blankenborg, Bühler, Cekuolis,
Clerfayt, Daly, Dreyfus-Schmidt,
Durrieu, Eörsi, Frey, Glesener, Gligoroski (remplaçant :
Bajrami), Gönül,
Gross, Henry,
Hornhues, Hovhannisyan, Hrebenciuc, Iwinski, Judd,
Karpov, Kautto,
Klich, Koçi,
Kostenko,
Lloyd (remplaçant :
Chapman), Loutfi,
Margelov,
Martinez-Casan, Medeiros
Ferreira, Mignon, Mutman,
Naudi Mora, Neguta, Nemeth,
Oliynyk, Paegle,
Pangalos,
Pourgourides,
Prentice, Prisacaru,
de Puig,
Ragnarsdottir, Ranieri (remplaçante :
de Zulueta), Rogozin,
Schloten (remplaçante :
Lörcher), Severinsen,
Timmermans (remplaçante :
Zwerver), Toshev,
Turjacanin, Vakilov,
Vella,
Volpirani, Voog (remplaçante :
Klaar), Weiss, Wielowieyski,
Wohlwend, Wurm,
Yarygina,
Zacchera, Ziuganov (remplaçant :
Slutsky), Zhvania,
ZZ ……., Espagne (remplaçant :
Solé Tura)
N.B.
Les noms des membres qui ont pris part ŕ la réunion sont imprimés en
caractčres italiques
Secrétaires
de la commission :
M. Perin, M. Chevtchenko, M. Dossow, Mme Entzminger, Mlle Alleon
Source: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(T)
