Two Wars, One MessTwo Wars, One Mess
By Boris Kagarlitsky
The news out of the Middle East lately has become more and more reminiscent of reports from Chechnya. In fact, the very essence of the two conflicts seems surprisingly similar. Both the current crisis in the occupied territories and the second war in Chechnya are not merely the continuations of long-running conflicts; both are to a large extent the unfortunate results of a failed cease-fire, of a bad peace.
The old saw that "a bad peace is better than a good war" is certainly true, but it is also true that a bad peace will inevitably end up leading precisely to another conflict. It is hard not to notice the similarities between the Oslo Peace Accords and the Russian-Chechen cease-fire that was signed in Khassav-Yurt. In Oslo, the Palestinians sought autonomy and settled for a partial troop withdrawal. Meanwhile, Palestine itself was given "indeterminate status," exactly as Chechnya was after the 1996 agreements. For both of these nations, this indetermination has meant the constant fear of reoccupation, while for Israel and Russia it has meant the constant fear of terrorism.
Moreover, both Palestinian "autonomy" under Yassar Arafat and "independent" Ichkeria under Aslan Maskhadov have turned out to be complete disasters. The Palestinian administration has proven incapable of ruling: It is both corrupt and incompetent. Living standards have fallen and economic dependence on Israel has increased. Chechnya has been pure chaos.
No sooner had Palestinian officials and Chechen warlords achieved both peace and power than they set about establishing dubious ties with the very people they had vowed to protect their people from — the Israelis on one hand and the Russian oligarchs on the other.
Psychologically, the cease-fires were based on a general war-weariness. After just a few years, that weariness passed and was replaced by a general frustration that the anticipated fruits of peace had not materialized. In both cases, the fighting resumed with a violence and intensity that would have been unimaginable a few years ago.
You have to hand it to Ariel Sharon. His visit to the Temple Mount was a stunning provocation. Not only did he manage to offend the Palestinians but, more importantly, he fired up Israeli Jews as well. You see, emigrпs from the former Soviet Union play a crucial role in Israeli politics. But under ordinary circumstance they are not very much concerned with the fate of Jewish holy sites. They eat pork Saturdays and think more about salaries, housing and jobs than about the symbolic significance of Jerusalem for the Jewish nation. Therefore, despite their strong suspicions of the Arabs, they generally vote for the liberals who promise them peace and jobs. Until, that is, violence flares. As soon as that happens, former Soviet Jews immediately turn into rapid hawks and call for bombing. Slogans like, "They are killing our people," easily overwhelm the voice of reason.
Sharon’s move was right on target. The former Soviet Jews fell into line as soon as the fighting started and Israeli conservatives had their little victory over the liberals. And it would seem they are completely satisfied with the price they paid for it: the destabilization of the entire Middle East and the sparking of a crisis that may end up taking hundreds or even thousands of lives.
These developments are also startlingly similar to events in Russia. The Kremlin elite wanted to win the parliamentary elections in 1999 and the presidential election this spring. The Chechen war was an amazingly successful campaign strategy. The goal was achieved — the Kremlin’s choice has become president. But the war continues and no one can come up with an acceptable way out.
Both the Israeli and Russian leaderships were quick to pronounce that those sitting across the table from them were unacceptable negotiating partners. "Maskhadov doesn’t control anything," was Moscow’s line, while Israel maintains that "Arafat is not capable of managing the situation." And indeed, the leadership elites in both conflicts had lost control over events. Both in Chechnya and in Palestine, the uprisings are now driven by radical Moslems. The moderate forces that were the political base for both Arafat and Maskhadov have steadily lost their influence as their nations’ "indeterminate status" made it impossible for them to improve living conditions for the majority of their people. The longer these conflicts continue, the more these moderate forces become prisoners of the radicals.
It is always easier to bring the crowds out into the streets than to get them to go home again. In these conflicts, all sides have long since taken the stand, "We’ll fight until we win." Really, though, they all understand that the only solution is some sort of compromise. But how can you explain that to people whose passions have been inflamed by nationalistic slogans?
Lately, President Vladimir Putin has been hinting at possible contacts with Maskhadov, and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak met with Arafat in Egypt. These partners, who just recently were dismissed as "irrelevant and powerless," have suddenly turned out to be extremely important. However, it is obvious that neither Arafat nor Maskhadov will be able to stop the violence unless they can do something to show their people the blood spilled has not been in vain. And that means something must be done to restrict Israeli and Russian "great-power patriotism."
As a result, both Israel and Russia will most likely end up with peace agreements that are much worse than the ones they might have had if they had been willing to negotiate reasonably from the beginning. And those less-than-desirable agreements will only have been reached after long, bloody and completely senseless fighting. Only then will the next wave of war-weariness once again overwhelm the disenchantment caused by the last bad peace.
Boris Kagarlitsky is a Moscow-based sociologist. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.
Source: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2000/10/31/006.html
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