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Putin’s neo-Eurasianism, or Models of the construction of a new Russian identity and their implications

By Dr. Dmitry Shlapentokh for Prague Watchdog

After long years of the political/ideological turmoil of the Gorbachev and Yeltsin era, the authorities have tried to instill the citizens of the Russian Federation with a sense of patriotism. They use the mass media for this goal, for example, patriotic songs about Russia on the radio.

This reinvented patriotism goes along with an attempt to recreate an ideological framework for Russia as a multi-ethnic state, actually an empire, a mini-copy of pre-revolutionary Russia.

This ideology usually downplays the biological/racial aspect of “Russianness” and dissolves it in a broadly defined culture in the same way it was dissolved in a “Soviet” identity. This ideology also has a sort of lingering imperial propensity, implying that Russia can directly or indirectly absorb at least some of the presently independent former republics of the USSR.

“Eurasian” models have been employed by the intellectual elite and have had some, albeit steadily declining, popularity among the Russian masses.

A New Eurasian Model as a Framework for the “Rossiiane” Identity

“Eurasianism” emerged in the 1920s among Russian émigrés, mostly those who settled in Prague and Paris and proclaimed that Russia is neither a Slavic nor a West European country but a peculiar mixture of Slavic and Muslim people of various ethnic origins.

Since the late Gorbachev era, Eurasianism has become quite a popular creed, providing a kind of philosophical setting for the notion of “Rossiiane,” which includes all citizens of the Russian Federation regardless of their ethnicity.

This “Eurasian” identity is apparently supported by Putin and those members of the elite who regard inter-confessional/inter-ethnic peace as a basis for the very stability of the Russian Federation.

For other supporters of this approach, it is the framework for restoring Russia to its Soviet greatness: once again a civilizational/global center.

Dreams of Resurrecting an Empire

Despite—or possibly because of—the fact that the USSR fell apart 15 years ago, there is a strong nostalgia for lost empire. There are still those who believe that at least quite a few of the former republics could join Russia in a sort of loose new edition of the USSR.

Indeed, the Russian elite has emphasized that not only all ethnic/religious groups can live in harmony but a considerable number of citizens of the former USSR would rather join hands with Russia once again. It is assumed that this desire is held by the majority of the common people of the former USSR, and that only the resistance of the nationalistic-minded elite prevents them from joining with Russia in a new alliance.

Slavic people such as the Ukrainians have the strongest feeling for rejoining their Orthodox brothers. The dissatisfaction/desires of the ethnic Russian minorities and considerable numbers of Russified Ukrainians are presented as the desires of the entire Ukrainian populace.

For example, in summer 2006 there was TV news coverage of a demonstration against several hundred American soldiers who had landed in the Crimea. The commentators emphasized that those who participated in the demonstration wanted not just removal of NATO troops from the Crimea/Ukraine but also reunification with Russia.

For Alexander Dugin, one of the best-known Russian Eurasianists, not just most Slavic people of the former USSR but most ethnic groups of the former USSR are anxious to be united around Russia in a Eurasian alliance. This holds with the people of the Caucasus, including Chechens; it is foreign forces, e.g., Wahhabists, inspired by the USA, who tried to snatch Chechnya and other Muslims in the Caucasus from the Eurasian body.

According to Dugin, the new edition of the USSR as a decentralized Eurasian empire with Russia as its center would lead to a web of empires, all of whom would regard confrontation with the USA as their major goal.

Still, it is not the new-imperial ambitions of some segments of the Russian ruling elite. “Neo-Eurasianism” has become the essential ingredient of an ideology aimed to forge a common identity among the diverse ethnic groups of the Russian Federation.

Neo-Eurasianism as the Ideology of Common Identity

While “Neo-Eurasianism” plays a variety of roles in Putin’s Russia, its major role is clear: to provide ideological justification for Russia as a multi-ethnic state, one that is still pre-modern in many ways. Indeed, the legal framework that binds the modern state together through a definition of common citizenship that transcends ethnic and even linguistic boundaries does not work in Russia. The notion of a common culture/historical destiny—provided by Eurasianism—is needed to prop up the still weak notion of  “the citizens of the Russian Federation” to ensure the very survival of present-day Russia.

This crucial role of Eurasianism, in this or that form, has been integrated into the view of quite a few Russian pundits. Indeed, the leading intellectuals also promoted the idea of Russia as a multi-racial sort of Eurasian nation. This was, for example, the case leading intellectual and political advisor Valery Tishkov, who made a presentation at a conference the author attended in the summer of 2006. Tishkov acknowledged that Russia’s identity is confused, but argued that life became better during the post-Soviet era, both economically and spiritually, and that Russia today is witness to harmony between confessions/ethnic groups, e.g., Russians and Muslims of various ethnic backgrounds. In fact, Tishkov implied that they constitute a sort of quasi-Eurasianism nation of “Rossiiane.”

This ideology is not just circulated among a few members of the national elite but is widely disseminated by official/semi-official propaganda that tries to imbue the hetero-ethnic population of the Federation with a sense of common identity. The radio broadcasts, for example, inform  listeners that ”Rossiiane” include many different nationalities who live in peace with each other. Together, they survived the “hardships of the 1990s” and now are building a mighty and prosperous Russia.

The idea of a happy symbiosis between Russians and ethnic minorities is promoted by Putin himself. Putin gave national prizes to both Patriarch and Tatar intellectuals, and the event was shown on TV. Presently tightly controlled by the authorities, Russian national TV presents the image of happy minorities living in peace and contentment and full harmony with Russians. They have no conflict with each other and differ from each other only in the idiosyncrasies of  their cultures and habits.

For example, Chechens emerged as exotic and amorous, marked by boundless energy, insatiable sexual drive, and love for martial arts. Other ethnic minorities were also covered in telecasts. For example, Kalmyks in their exotic attire were mentioned, indicating their full incorporation in the happy “Eurasian” family of “Rossiiane.”

Eurasianism and the Masses: Declining Acceptance

One can of course ask to what degree the ideas beaming from radio and TV are accepted by average citizens of the Russian Federation, especially ethnic Russians. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these ideas are indeed accepted by some segments of the population, including ethnic Russians. Indeed, this latent “Eurasianism,” the legacy of the Soviet era when “Russianness” was actually broader than the clause “ethnicity” (natsional'nost') in the Soviet passport, is still alive among some segments of the Russian population. This is mostly the case with those who were brought up in the Soviet era. This sort of people can still regard as “Russian” almost any minority if Russified by culture and language.

I found examples of this approach among a group of Russian women in their fifties with whom I shared a long train ride during one of my recent trips to Russia. A Bashkir boy was also among this group. I asked him whether he knew Bashkir or intended to study it. He responded that he neither knew nor was going to study Bashkir. Listening to our conversation, one of the women made a comment, “This boy does not study Bashkir because he is Russian.” Clearly for these women “Russianness” is interpreted in a sort of loose “Eurasian” way that emphasizes the cultural/linguistic aspects of identity and discards racial definitions of “Russianness.”

This vision of Russianness is also directly related to dreams of the resurrection of the USSR or some other larger entity in which culturally/linguistically defined Russianness would be dissolved/interwoven with a much larger identity. It is true that “Eurasian” feelings are still alive, not only among the elite but even among average ethnic Russians. But those who express this ideology are mostly people in their late forties and especially in their fifties and older. They are increasingly marginalized by rising Russian nationalism, which more and more defines Russianness through ethnicity, as a racial/biological category. The revolts in Kondopoga (late August-early September 2006) and the November 4 “Russian march” indicate this.

Conclusion

Present-day Russia is a peculiar social-economic construction, built out of blocks from different parts of Russian history and the modern West. The same could be said about the regime’s ideology, its attempt to create a new identity to provide a common point of reference for Russians and minorities.

This ideology—a mix of the old notion of “Soviet people” and reinvented Eurasianism—should, in principle, not just cement the Russian Federation but provide a framework for the larger project of a new edition of the USSR with its integration into a major web of alliances.

This vision of Russia is increasingly under pressure from several ideological trends. One of the most important is Russian nationalism in its often racially defined form, whose proponents have no desire to see Russia as a center of a “Eurasian” space in which Russia would once again play a benign and generous “brother” to other ethnic groups.

The representatives of this trend have no desire to see Russia as a nucleus of any variation of the USSR, but discard the very notion of “Rossiiane”—the integrated “Eurasianism” of the Russian Federation. They promulgated the slogan “Russia for Russians,” and this trend as manifested in the recent ethnic violence in Kondopoga and the November 4 demonstration hardly bodes well for the stability of the Russian Federation.

December 12, 2006

Dr. Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of History at Indiana University South Bend, USA. His recent book is "East Against West" (Publish America, 2005).

(T/B)