Administration in Chechnya Gets New Status
Administration in Chechnya Gets New Status
Musa Tumsoyev, Candidate of Economic Sciences
Special to Prague Watchdog
As the guerilla war in Chechnya continues, Russian government resolutions approved at the beginning of the year closely involve Chechnya. The Russian president’s decree on the system of executive bodies in Chechnya and measures concerning the fight against terrorism in the Northern-Caucasian district of the Russian Federation; the Russian government approval of a federal program to restore the economic and social spheres in Chechnya; the decision to reduce the number of federal forces in Chechnya--all these newly declared resolutions are expected to be seen as evidence of decreasing tensions in the Russian-Chechen crisis and of the possibility of restoring peace to the Chechen people. However, the newly appointed head of the headquarters for the conduct of counter-terrorist operations in the Northern Caucasus has said that today there are still some 5,000 guerillas in Chechnya. This is in contrast to the hopes for peace--for the numbers of actively fighting Chechens given by senior military and political leaders last year were between 1,500 and 2,000. Moreover, "serious" resolutions on political, military, and economic grounds are most likely to be merely declarations of "good" intentions and expressions of interest in "smoothing out" the situation. The decree on the system of executive bodies in Chechnya provides for the head of administration being the highest official post in the republic. Thus, the republic’s administration is getting legal authority. However, real power in Chechnya continues to be held by Russian generals. In accordance with the decree, the Chechen government is formed by the head of administration based on the prime minister’s proposal and approved by the plenipotentiary of the president in the Southern Federal Region. Considering the Chechen administration chief, Akhmad Kadyrov, does not have much say in the candidacy for the prime minister of Chechnya, he is likely to be quite limited in tackling personnel and other problems. As is generally known, Kadyrov intended to be prime minister and the head of administration concurrently (or alternatively, to give the post of prime minister to "his man"). Intriguingly, the government of Chechnya was actually established on the principles of "internationality" and "ideology," which enhanced the probability of appointing ministers and top officials who will not take good care of either the economy or the Chechens. This system is scarcely better that the clan principle of forming an administration. It is possible to take the view that in the final stages of forming a government in Chechnya Kadyrov--defending his authoritarian powers—was defeated. Moscow had beaten him earlier in the "clash" over the ownership of the "bowels of the Chechen earth"--in other words, the territory's oil resources. The reality of a decision by the Russian government has been to hand the Chechen oil refining complex over to the Russian-owned "Rosneft" oil company. In addition, the provision that introduced the post of "minister for coordinating the federal authorities’ activities in economic and social development in the Chechen Republic" has not influenced economic or social security restoration. As a matter of fact, there are reasonable doubts about officials’ appointments when leading posts in Chechnya, whether that of a federal minister or prime minister, are given to politicians who lost elections and support in their regions. Stanislav Ilyasov, Chechnya‘s prime minister de facto appointed by the Kremlin, ran unsuccessfully for governor in the Stavropol region against Vyacheslav Chernogorov, and Russian federal minister for Chechnya, Vladimir Yelagin, had been the governor of the Orenburg region until 1999, when he lost in the second round of the elections. As power structures in Chechnya are not subordinated to the head of administration, and real authority is continuously in the hands of military leaders. As such, the only thing Kadyrov can do is to be content to establish various consultative organs. On the other hand, it goes without saying that the administration -- as the government’s leading manager of federal budget resources earmarked for the republic -- will not take simply be an observer or put up with its limited powers. The Russian government’s plans for restoring the social and economic conditions in Chechnya in 2001 is counting on more than 14 billion rubles—a third of which is to be made up by funds from the federal budget and the rest is to be from extra-budget sources. The extra-budget sources are to be spent on the restoration of railways, electricity and gass supplies. Considering that the year 2000 saw 7 billion rubles spent for the same purposes, with restoration work going unnoticed, there are reasonable doubts about the sufficiency of the amount as well as the opportunity to use it effectively for the Chechen people. As Chechnya’s pro-Moscow premier Ilyasov estimates, the country’s economic restoration will require some 40 billion rubles in the next two or three years. This sum is equal to the amount of money Moscow is planning to earmark for Saint-Petersburg’s 300th anniversary celebrations. While in the first case, the raised funds will be used for the restoration of the whole republic’s destroyed economy, in the second case, within the same term of two and a half years, as much as 42 billion rubles will be spent on the restoration of historical places and preparing and having a huge banquet in a single city. One of the most significant issues is the question of the republic’s capital--for the rebuilding of the previously 400,000-strong industrial city of Grozny will require the highest expenses. The ”team” of Beslan Gantamirov, mayor of Grozny, has a lot to do if they want to remain influential and play an honest role in the distribution of financial resources. A number of the Russian administration’s intended plans in Chechnya have not been realized. Not due to the absence of control levers over Chechen territory, but because of the insolubility of the conflict itself. The change of the administration’s status (the formerly preceding ”temporary” is now omitted) does not mean that the situation has stabilized. The year 2000 was to see many plans: the introduction of railway transportation between Moscow and Grozny - deadline May 2000; the reintroduction of air transport for civilian planes - deadline August 2000; the transfer of the administration from Gudermes to Grozny--deadline November 2000. None of those things have been realized because the security of civilians as well as administrators could not be guaranteed. Besides the strategy approved by the federal government, there is also Kadyrov’s reform project in Chechnya agreed by Putin. The project additionally provides for the preparation of a legal framework in Chechnya with the aim of its return to the political and constitutional of Russia. Such an attitude toward the solution of the Russian-Chechen conflict is in correspondence with the position of Putin: ”The Chechen president was elected in violation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and we (in other words Russia) consider his presidency illegitimate.” However, the desire to rewrite the Constitution of the Chechen Republic and organize elections to the organs of state authority could be in conflict with the opinions of those who voted for Aslan Maskhadov’s presidency. The authoritarian tone in many statements by Russian political officials is weakened by the contradictory views they hold in private. "Moreover, even if one takes Maskhadov as president” and "if anybody wants to conduct negotiations with him, we will not be obstructive, although I consider it useless,” says Putin, supposing that Maskhadov’s presidency allegedly ends in January 2001. Aslan Maskhadov was elected on January 27, 1997. According ot the article 71 of the Chechen constitution, adopted on March 12, 1992, the President is elected for a five-year term of office. Moreover, the Chechen parliament adopted a resolution stating that “if by February 2002 the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria is not fully liberated, the President and the Parliament will remain in office until the right conditions for free expression of the will of the Chechen people is created.” There is no doubt that official Russian refusal to hold political talks with the legitimate Chechen authority flatters the administration of Kadyrov. The present Chechen administration will be interested in the forthcoming elections in January 2002 with the aim of legalizing its authority in the eyes of the public. As the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe was preparing to hold a session on January 22 to 26, what Russian officials did by approving new decrees and provisions concerning Chechnya, was merely attempting to persuade the world, as well as the Russian people, to believe that there had been a breakthrough in the conflict. All official statements about the end of the military campaign in Chechnya (as a matter of fact, the end of the large-scale operation was declared as early as Spring 2000); promises about the reduction of the Russian troops; the transfer of the management of the counter-terrorist operation to the federal security services; announcements of economic restoration projects; and the establishment of a Chechen administration with its own government may calm those who „feel sympathy“ for the Chechen nation. However, they cannot provide security for the nation itself until the actual source of the conflict, the issue of the political status of the Chechen Republic, is solved. The Khasav-Yurt agreements of August 31, 1996 that terminated the 1994-96 war, stated that the “agreement on the terms for relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic to be decided in accordance with generally accepted principles and norms of international law, must be reached before 31 December 2001,” which gave Russia time to recover after the humiliating defeat, take a breath and attack again. Therefore the current decisions, widely interpreted and recognized by the world community as the long-expected and promising moves, have only paved the already outlined way to hell.
Musa Tumsoyev is a Candidate of Economic Sciences and regular contributor to Prague Watchdog.
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