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CHECHNYA LINKS LIBRARY

December 21st 2000 · Prague Watchdog / Ilya Maksakov · PRINTER FRIENDLY FORMAT · E-MAIL THIS · ALSO AVAILABLE IN: RUSSIAN 

Chechnya - A Zone of Irresponsibility (Part II - The Outlook from Chechnya)

by Ilya Maksakov, correspondent of „Nezavisimaya gazeta“

special to Prague Watchdog (www.watchdog.cz)

To see Part I (The Outlook from Moscow) click here

OUTLOOK FROM CHECHNYA

A serene calm has settled over the camp of pro-Russian-oriented politicians. More precisely, only those who have taken up a post are showing any signs of activity. Others only rarely appear with their evaluations of the situation, having understood that no changes in the Kremlin’s Chechen policy are to be expected. The head of the Chechnya administration Akhmad Kadyrov speaks of three things wherever and whenever he appears: he speaks about his lack of authority; he tells of conducting negotiations with some field commanders and he calls on the “unable to control anything” Aslan Maskhadov to “confess” and leave Russia. Lately he has expanded his expressions with refutations of rumours about his impending resignation. Kadyrov is going to lead Chechnya until the election of new government bodies and “after the election if the people so wish”. He constantly refers to the president of Russia as he who trusts and helps him, in Kadyrov’s own words. And remarkably, he regards Moscow Chechens to be the instigators of the rumours about his future resignation, although, as stated above, the Russian leadership really does have such plans. Besides this, Kadyrov accuses Moscow Chechens and mainly businessman Malik Saidullayev of “doing nothing to help their own people”.

Akhmad Kadyrov cannot resist standing for a reduction in federal forces in Chechnya, understanding as he does the people’s displeasure with federal shows of strength. He also calls for a reduction in roadblocks, which “are useless” and “have not helped to detain a single partisan and just make peaceful people suffer”. Kadyrov likewise stands against violations of human rights and the conducting of “obscure cleanings” as well. But the Chechen State Duma delegate Aslambek Aslakhanov remains the most consistent critic of the federal forces’ actions. As had to be expected he has become a thorn in the side of the Kremlin, which, however, has not prevented him from being received by the head of state. Aslakhanov constantly calls for the implementation of a “genuine order” in Chechnya from the rostrum of the State Duma, he criticises Russian ministries and departments, declares that there is “complete lawlessness” in Chechnya and protests against unlawful detentions of Chechens both inside the republic and beyond it.

Beslan Gantamirov is also an inconvenient political figure for Moscow. However, despite many of his scandalous appearances he appears to be the most dirigible Chechen leader. His conflict with Akhmad Kadyrov turned into a real farce in the course of time. After attempts to “clear” Gudermes out of the Chechen administration, harsh statements about Kadyrov and a complete break-off of relations with him, Gantamirov made “peace” with him “for a long time”, apparently having been satisfied with his appointment to the post of the Mayor of Grozny, already the third in his brief resumé. But he also put Moscow representatives into difficulties after that, making them deal with scandals he initiated. Thus Gantamirov has recently even called for an immediate cessation of the antiterrorist operation, until an urgent re-attestation of all law-enforcement servicemen in Chechnya whom he accused of directly abetting partisans, has been performed. He warned that “the current situation is threatening and could lead to large-scale conflict between federal structures and militia if it is not immediately defused”. Gantamirov also called for regulation of the activities of federal forces’ bodies as up to 15 people get killed daily as the result of shootings and unlawful actions during “cleanings” conducted in Grozny, in his words. A bit earlier the Mayor of Grozny became as a character from a fantastic story when he allegedly stole the famous field commander Arbi Barayev from the hands of the Russian special services. After a while, both Gantamirov and Russian law-enforcement bodies denied this information.

All of these stormy actions by Gantamirov made Sergey Yastrzhembsky name him a “surprising man” who “can draw the most contrary of statements in a short period of time”. In his opinion, the problem is that the Chechen militia does not obey Gantamirov. Together with this, Yastrzhembsky had to recognise the partisans’ attempts to infiltrate the militia. Anatoly Kvashnin, in his turn, also admitted, that “somebody who is now serving in the Chechen militia keeps on working for the opposite side”.

Another participant in scandals is Malik Saidullayev, the last among representatives of the Chechen diaspora who has not apparently lost hope of taking his place in the political process. But one thing Akhmad Kadyrov has right, is that the State Council of Chechnya of which Saidullayev calls himself chairman does not exist, not least because its founder Amin Osmayev declared its dissolution a long time ago. Nevertheless, Saidullayev appears with his own political proposals and among them the main one is the introduction of direct presidential control in Chechnya with the leader on the level of vice-prime minister. According to his forecast, the social and economic spheres in Chechnya can be returned to the level of 1990 in a matter of two to three years, after which legitimate democratic elections are to be held, in the course of which people will elect a truly deserving leader. What is more, Saidullayev recently entered the fray with a statement which went almost unnoticed by anyone and which could have become a sensation if it were true. He claims his people managed to stop the system of financial aid to Chechen partisans from various organisations in Turkey.

As for the leaders of the Chechen separatists, their condition can be still judged based on the propaganda sources in Russia and Ichkeria, which are diametrically opposed to each other. But if one supposes these are trying to keep away from information warfare then they can be said not to be experiencing the best of times, even having enough forces to resist the federal ones. The picture presented by Russian propaganda shows that factions between the leaders of Chechen partisans and Jordan mercenary Emir Khattab have lately become seriously more acute. Ruslan Gelayev, Arbi Barayev, Magomed Khambiyev, Vakha Arsanov and Magomed Tsagarayev are allegedly discontent with the fact that assets received by separatists from abroad come into Khattab and Basayev’s hands. It is also considered that the most odious field commanders have not discarded plans to liquidate Aslan Maskhadov. The latter is attempting to bring order to the mechanism of financial aid income from foreign sponsors and accuses his emissaries in Transcaucasus and Turkey of embezzlement. According to information from the Russian side, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Vakha Arsanov, Movladi Udugov and Akhmed Zakayev have been out of Chechnya for a long time, while the military wing of the separatists, the famous field commanders, still remain in Chechnya. Russian troops also assert that Ruslan Gelayev’s division is on Georgian territory.

At the same time Aslan Maskhadov still states his readiness to conduct negotiations with the Russian side with the purpose of stopping the war in Chechnya without pre-conditions. He has also expressed a readiness to meet the first president of Russia Boris Yeltsin, who Maskhadov sees as the possible initiator of a cease-fire. Salman Raduyev, held inside Lefortovo SIZO (detention prison), also reminded us of his existence by stating that “the war could be stopped at any moment”. He gave an assurance that the Chechen side would compromise with Moscow as much as possible, going as far as tolerating military barracks in Chechnya and maintaining Russia’s territorial integrity.

The most radical wing of the Chechen separatists has not reduced its activity in information matters although it has made several mistakes in this regard. In the first instance, their information sources informed us of Shamil Basayev’s statement in support of the Palestinians in their opposition to the Israelis and of his readiness to send Chechen partisans to the Middle East. But he then called the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organisation) leadership hypocrites, traitors and senile old men. Besides, the information bodies of Aslan Maskhadov hurried to dissociate themselves from Basayev’s statement concerning sending Chechen partisans to the Middle East, having called it “ungrounded lies” and Udugov’s Kavkaz-Center called it not having anything in common “either with the Chechen people or with the Chechen people’s struggle for independence.” And this became further evidence that the clique of Chechen separatists is as far from unity as it has ever been. Another failure of the Basayev - Udugov clique was Azerbaijan’s extradition of six Dagestanis accused by Makhachkala of various crimes against Russia. The Kavkaz-Center failed to think of anything better than to call on the president of Azerbaijan Geydar Aliyev “to immediately intervene and suppress the provocative activities of some leaders of the power structure”.

In the meantime federal forces have definitely caused notable damage to partisan leaders. Several field commanders have been killed recently, among them the well-known Isa Munayev and Baudi Bakuyev. The arrest of Aslan Maskhadov’s closest brothers-in-arms Mamadi Saydayev and, according to some despatches, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev, as well as the voluntary cessation of resistance on the part of field commander Vakhid Shakirov, could be considered successes for the Russian special services but for so many other misunderstandings in cases of “arrest” and “surrender”. For example, a rather long time ago the arrest of another brother-in-arms of Maskhadov - Khozh-Akhmed Yarikhanov - was announced. Then, after an alleged investigation, he was released. However Maskhadov has just recently said that Yarikhanov is his representative in negotiations with Moscow and has the authority to present the Chechen position.

And finally, other pieces of evidence of the less than ideal state the Chechen separatists find themselves in include the even more frequent murders of local leaders co-operating with the federal authorities, responsibility for which is always claimed by Movladi Udugov. In the course of the last months not less than a score of Chechen employees of Russian governmental bodies have become victims of such murders and even more attempted murders have taken place. In this event, even taking the separatists’ statements concerning the struggle with the “occupying regime” seriously, it has to be remarked upon that things are not going right for them even if they do not have any other troubles.

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