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Russian journalists in the second war in Chechnya

by Ilya Maksakov, a correspondent to Nezavisimaya gazeta

Special to Prague Watchdog

The character of the work of journalists in the Russian – Chechen war as well as the coverage of the conflict in Russian media is as contradictory as ambiguous the events in Chechnya are. Besides, the conditions in which journalists work now markedly differ not only from those in the first campaign in Chechnya (1994-1996), but to a large extent also from other “hot spots”. The contradictions appear there and everywhere, starting with the process of selecting those who go to Chechnya to report, and ending with journalists’ articles, reviews and TV and radio reports.

It should be stressed that no matter how exceptional the war in Chechnya seems to be, it is a war in which people, i. e. journalists as well, die. However, regardless of the generally accepted view of the present conflict as more cruel than the first one, journalists in fact have been victims in the second campaign less often than between 1994 and 1996.

In July 1999 Vladimir Yatsina, an ITAR-TASS photographer and correspondent, was kidnapped and then, in 2000, killed in Ingushetia. On October 29, 1999, TV-Centr correspondent Ramzan Mezhidov and Grozny TV cameraman Shamil Gigayev were killed. Two days before, on October 27, 1999, the "Groznenski rabochi" correspondent Supyan Ependiyev was fatally injured during the shelling of Grozny. On October 17, 1999, Alexander Loskutov of “Morskoi sbornik” died. Then came the killing of the “Istina mira” correspondent Luiza Arzhiyeva on March 22, 2000. On May 12, 2000, the “Nashe vremya” photographer and correspondent Alexander Yefremov was killed. On November 20, 2000, TV cameraman Adam Tepsurgayev was killed. In addition, journalists Iles Magomedov and Khanpasha Terkibayev have disappeared without trace in Chechnya.

Besides those cases, over three years of the present conflict in Chechnya, journalists have been coming under fire, becoming victims of acts of terrorism and sustaining injuries, facing detentions, searches and beatings by federal forces. In other words, they have experienced all the “beauties” of the armed conflict.

Though the improvement in the security of journalists in comparison with the 1994 –1996 conflict is easy to explain, there is one shortcoming – the lack of an objective picture of what is going on in Chechnya. A lot has been said about federal authorities’ thorough control of journalists’ coverage of Chechnya. And this is really true.

Though many criticize and call illegal the accreditation procedure in the department of Sergei Yastrzhembski, Russian President’s Aide on Chechnya, scarcely any journalist heading for Chechnya fails to get the accreditation card. In Chechnya journalists are located at the Russian military base in Khankala and at the complex of buildings of the Moscow-backed Chechen government in Grozny. Very often they produce their reports without leaving the premises of the two places. Any movement around Chechnya is made only in the presence either of soldiers or officials, or as a part of some delegation. Obviously, there were exceptions, but these are extremely rare.

What matters is not that correspondents have fear of the war. A great number of journalists are real professionals and brave people. Moreover, quite many of them could not even imagine working outside “hot spots”. Therefore the war itself does not pose any obstacle to their activities. However, what is different from the first Russian-Chechen war is that nowadays journalists would not take the risk of moving around Chechnya by themselves. The possibility of being kidnapped, the thing extremely rare in the previous conflict, seems to be worse for them than coming under fire of any of the conflicting sides. And their today’s fear is even more reasonable because the number kidnaps that seemed to end three years ago is on the rise again.

There is one more reason why war journalists are in close contact with soldiers and authorities. In the present conflict journalists do not try work in camps of Chechen fighters. Although the fighting in Chechnya cannot be entirely called a conflict between two nations, a crushing majority of the Russian media has already created their picture of the enemy. To imagine a Russian journalist working among Chechen fighters is as difficult as seeing an Azerbaijani one doing so in the Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore it is not understandable how Russian journalists should follow more closely Sergei Yastrzhembski’s call on them to “impose self-restrictions on information omnivorousness upon the experience of the Americans”. In addition, even “neutral” western journalists would not risk getting close to Aslan Maskhadov, let alone Shamil Basayev.

What is striking, even the leaders of Chechen separatists, who operate much more conspiratorially than 6–7 years ago, make no efforts to invite journalists. Of course, if one really wishes, it is possible to visit them or their supporters or representatives in Chechnya. However, Russian journalists as a rule do not wish so. Besides, the view of Chechen separatists on the ongoing events has been heavily featured on their Internet sites. Another question is that their opinions appear in Russian media extremely rarely. The point is not that journalists would be afraid of the authorities' anger, though such cases are not unique. For the above mentioned reasons, most journalists simply do not assume positions opposing the federal forces, although there are exceptions to this rule as well.

As a result, it is impossible to create an objective picture of the events in Chechnya. Journalists who are in Chechnya report only on what they are allowed to see. And while using the information sources of the fighting sides, one has a tough job evaluating the situation properly because what he deals with is not information but propaganda. Of course, there are other sources of information, for example human rights organizations. However, a weak point here resides in the fact that their reports are frequently based on eyewitnesses' testimonies that often miss objectivity.

There is one shining and unique example of journalist work - Anna Politkovskaya, a correspondent to „Novaya gazeta“. She does not work among fighters, although she published interviews with leaders of Chechen separatists as well. The principle of her work is to go to Chechnya to those spots to which propagandista centres of both conflicting sides pay key attention. Local inhabitants are often the main protagonists of her stories as well as their basic information sources. Her writing is of strictly antimilitary nature, which fully contradicts the official Russian propaganda. Therefore almost all of her articles are published by Chechen sources and are absolutely ignored by the Russian ones.

Actually, every journalist can go on „Politkovskaya´s routes“. Many of them used to visit even more remote places, nevertheless, not every media, even those criticizing the events in Chechnya, is ready to publish such kind of material.

Moreover, plenty of Politkovskaya´s journeys and writing take political consequences with participation of high officials. And this is another aspect of journalist work during the second Chechen conflict.

Journalism sometimes directly impinges on political events in Russia, and even becomes the headline news. The first example was the case of Radio Free Europe correspondent Andrei Babitski, who worked among Chechen fighters defending Grozny at the very beginning of the second Chechen war. If one does not comment on the details and assessment of various incidents connected with him, one could notice how the „Babitski case“ effectively split politicians and journalists into two antagonistic sides and how it obtained grew into a nationwide affair involving even President Putin.

At the same time, this case shows that the new Russian authorities do not tolerate any alternative points of view on the events in Chechnya. This and many other examples show how the Russian authorities endeavour to prevent their nation from „incorrect“ information. A pathological response of almost all branches of the Russian power to the Radio Free Europe´s broadcasting in three Caucasian languages belongs to these ranks. This problem has been discussed for at least one year. No direct threats toward the Radio station were heard, however, a possibility to review the station’s Russian broadcasting license was hinted on innumerable occasions.

Literally each interview with Chechen separatist leaders provokes huge criticism, which can result in special warnings by the Ministry of the Press to „hyper-eager“ media. Moreover, the State Duma passed in the first reading amendments to the Media Act and to the Anti-terrorist Fighting Act, which should prevent „propagation of ideas of extremism and terrorism in the media“. Russian journalists cannot obviously understand why they are not allowed to interpret the words of those who the state authorities contact in accordance with a presidential order.

By the way, the pursuit of media because of their interpreting words of Chechen separatists calmed down more or less after the meeting of Viktor Kazantsev and Akhmed Zakayev a year ago. Let us also remind that during the war there have been such incidents when particular politicians filed a suit against journalists for reporting on the Chechen theme - and they won.

Thus the aversion of the authorities to the dissemination of alternative views is evident, however, journalists and media can publish whatever material they wish, anyway. The situation with the freedom of speech in Russia is much more hopeful than in many other CIS countries. By the way, recently one Russian paper published an exclusive interview with Shamil Basayev himself. Official structures seemed to have just ignored this exceptional event, or they at least did not denounce it openly.

There is just another important aspect of journalist work on Chechen problems. The journalists, as well as the society they represent, become not only the objects of propaganda, but also the involuntary weapons in the information war between two conflicting sides.

The journalists who are forced to repeatedly cite representatives of the military claiming that the situation in Chechnya is „difficult but can be regulated and is under control“ arouse compassion on one hand. But on the other hand, sometimes one can notice how various information activities of Chechen propagandists achieve the objective when being published by the Russian press. The lot of captives of the Chechen fighters can serve as an example. Chechen information sources all the time announce about the execution of these captives, they are cited by the journalists, and in fact they blackmail the Russian political and military leadership.

A few words is to be said about those for whose sake the „order“ in Chechnya is being restored – about the citizens of the republic. They see everything with their own eyes, and if not, they inform one another faster than journalists do. So we can imagine how they accept triumphant statements of the Russian military which are heard every day on almost every TV programme. Anyway, Chechens have always been very politicized and felt necessary to be informed and to get acquainted with different views. Central newspapers, however, do not reach the citizens nowadays or with big delays. And local papers can write about whatever they want, except for the war. Reading Chechen publications one would think it is a newspaper from some quiet Russian province.

Finally, we can say that over the three years of the second Chechen war the Russian media has become more critical to the activities of the federal authorities. And the society in general is tired of the war. Nevertheless, unlike the first campaign, now there are no absolute supporters of the Chechen resistance among the leading Russian media as well as among the politicians, even the opposition ones.

(T)