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Killing mosquitoes with a hammer, or the Russian army’s efforts to combat terrorism

Petr Janouch, special to Prague Watchdog

The Russian army’s situation in the turbulent Northern Caucasus is absurd and a bit contradictory. Not only does it continue to be involved in anti-terrorist operations that is really not their mission, but it faces persistent problems with obsolete equipment and lack of sufficient training.

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov described his men’s attempts at fighting Chechen separatists like trying to kill mosquitoes with a hammer. Nevertheless, they keep on trying.

Professional draftees

In March, the Russian State Duma finally passed a law that will now allow the Ministry of Defense to use personnel and financial means to combat terrorism. Officially the new law was enacted as a reaction of the government and President Putin’s administration to the Beslan tragedy. According to observers, however, it is actually an endeavor to legalize existing courses of action in Northern Caucasus.

The 42nd motorized division, permanently deployed in Chechnya, has long been involved in operations against the Chechen guerrillas, as was the Pskov-based 76th paratroop division until it was withdrawn at the end of last year.

But since the beginning of this year only professional contract soldiers, kontraktniki, can serve in the 42nd division; Defense Minister Ivanov has nothing but praise for them, saying they’ve proven their effectiveness during anti-terrorist operations. It is they, he insists, who have developed and applied new approaches in fighting illegal armed formations.

Yet how was it possible to exchange drafted servicemen for professional troops within such a short time? There is no doubt that financial motivation played a role in this. A regular soldier in Chechnya earns 16 to 17,000 rubles a month (almost $600); while outside this dangerous area the average pay of an army private is 7,046 rubles (about $250).

On the other hand, some human rights organizations complained that commanding officers pressured their soldiers to “voluntarily” sign contracts. Similar cases have been noted in Ingushetia where a group of servicemen threatened to desert rather than sign. In a letter sent anonymously to human rights organizations, they described the severe pressure exerted by their superiors and threats of punishment if they failed to obey orders and sign the contracts.

According to the observers, this is a typical Soviet way of trying to fill quotas and keep Putin’s earlier promise to withdraw all Defence Ministry's conscripts from Chechnya as of January 2005. However, the professionals drafted in this manner suffer from the usual disorders of the Russian army. Contract soldiers show the same lack of discipline along with bullying, criminal behavior and corruption. Needless to say, this not only decreases combat efficiency but also any respect the local citizens might have for them.

In addition, their efficiency is further lessened due to their obsolete equipment. Although outdated means of communication is being replaced with modern transmitters, the soldiers have to buy this equipment with their own money. Bullet-proof vests are old, but they have yet to be replaced. And the lack of high quality night vision equipment enables enemies to fearlessly move around in the dark.

Unprofessional command

Mahmud Gareyev, head of the Military Science Academy, believes that the main problem Russia faces in its fight against terrorism is the lack of coordination and professionalism among the commanders. Responsible organizations such as the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Defense and Interior Ministries are unable to effectively exchange information or even coordinate their subordinates in Chechnya.

According to official data, 80,000 members of various Russian armed forces are active in Chechnya plus about 14,000 employees of local security agencies. The best known of the latter are the subordinates of Moscow-backed Chechen Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov, who have been accused of kidnappings and serious human rights violations.

If these numbers are truly correct, then the Russian armed forces in Chechnya have increased by 5,000 men since October 2003.

The anti-terrorist law adopted by the Russian Duma has changed the rules of the game. So far FSB officers have been responsible for coordinating federal activities, but now a military officer from the Federal Interior Ministry will be in command in the event of a terrorist attack.

The army and special units

Also new in the game are the special task troops of the Interior Ministry set up for anti-terrorist operations. President Putin decided on this system following the attacks on police stations in Ingushetia last year. According to some allegations, these units are comprised of 19,000 men; and they will also have their own private air force.

Although Putin would like the elite army units to quickly reach a Western level, it is not quite clear how to achieve this. One member of a Czech anti-terrorist unit thinks that in this area the enormous Russian vanity may collide with tactics. And plus the fact that the FSB does not believe anyone from a foreign country due to the support given, at least on a political level, to the Chechen separatists in the past.

According to Sergey Goncharov, former head of the FSB’s Alfa unit, involving the army in anti-terrorist operations is imperative. "The time has gone when a few Alfa officers could swoop in on a few terrorists holding several hostages and resolve the crisis in a matter of hours or even minutes. It is a real war now," the Moscow Times recently quoted him as saying. That’s why he believes army involvement in such cases, like the Beslan school siege, would be logical.

However, the Czech officer quoted earlier believes that Beslan proved the Russian military forces were not ready to face similar attacks. Armed civilians, whom the Russian units were unable to keep at a safe distance, attacked the school where their children were being held by the terrorists. At that moment special Alfa units had to step in, even though they were not fully prepared to do so.

Soldier or mercenary?

It’s quite obvious that the Russian army finds itself in an uncomfortable position. In order to become an efficient operational force again, it will not only have to make its command more professional and modernize its equipment, but it also urgently needs to change its relationship toward its rank and file soldiers.

Russia’s approach toward its own soldiers is not like the planned tributes handed out during the victory celebrations of WWII, but more an unwillingness and inability to take care of their recently wounded in a dignified manner.

The almost tragic-comic case this past January serves as an example. The Russian regional court in Orel recommended that Gennadi Uminski, a veteran from the first Chechen War, seek compensation for his 1996 injuries from the Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev since it was his men who had shot at him.

Uminski was wounded at a time when drafted soldiers, rather than professionals, fought in Chechnya for “the honor and glory of their country.”

So how can the Russian public support the wounded professional soldiers and the increased expenses to modernize their equipment when part of the Russian press describes professional soldiers of foreign armies as “mercenaries”?

Petr Janouch is an independent journalist.

(O/E,A,T)