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Unified Power Still Lacking in Chechnya, Common Opinion in Moscow

By Ilya Maksakov, Nezavisimaya gazeta
Special to Prague Watchdog

The beginning of the year 2001 saw an unprecedented amount of political activity at the Kremlin concerning Chechnya, especially in comparison with the evident idleness of the several preceding months. The Russian government made a whole range of really important decisions. As has been the rule on the Chechen scene, their estimations vary, even extreme views have emerged, but nobody has underestimated the significance of the measures. At last, Moscow has shaped all the ways of tackling the Chechen crisis - political, military, economic and even the one relating to foreign policy.

The first serious measure was the decree of the President of the Russian Federation about the system of executive power organs in Chechnya. It provides that the Chechen administration, having lost the attribute "temporary", will receive real power in place of the vague powers it has possessed up to now. As a matter of fact, ever since the provision was declared, there have been doubts about this ambition. Scarcely any doubts will be resolved if, as the provision says, Akhmed Kadyrov, administration chief, became "the top official in the Chechen Republic, having the right to appoint and remove his subordinates upon the assent of the presidential plenipotentiary in the Southern federal region and the prime minister of the Chechen government, who is the administration chief's deputy." Moreover, provisions by the chief of administration and the Chechen government, made within the bounds of their legal authority, are binding in the whole territory of Chechnya. If this is not real power, what is it? The period of more than seven months when the administration had been working can be considered a complete waste of time. The Kremlin itself made the administration incapable of work, having needed more than half a year to take a close look and finally give it true power. In addition, President Putin completely approved "A. Kadyrov's plan" that includes the introduction of an administration consulting organ made up of respected public representatives and religious officials. The plan is generally expected to prepare a normative legal basis that is necessary for the reintegration of Chechnya into political and legal areas of Russia. Akhmed Kadyrov also suggested that elaboration of a new Constitution of the Chechen Republic should be launched and the normative basis for conducting election to organs of state authority be created by December 2001.

This is the reason why considering the formal side of these measures as a removal of power from Kadyrov would be wrong, though some observers hurried to do so. Nonetheless, Kadyrov was in fact forced to give over the whole range of positions during the formation of a new Chechen government. He could not see his man in the post of government chief, taken by former Stavropol premier Stanislav Ilyasov, as well as in other top positions in the Cabinet. As it seems, tensions in the process of electing members of the Government are to blame for delays. A complete formation of the Cabinet failed to be done in more than a month. And Akhmed Kadyrov, who earlier had insisted that all appointments were made by himself, admitted later that virtually all the candidates he was given were nominated by Moscow. Besides, drawing the character of the Government formation, many stressed its "technical" nature and even helplessness in making decisions. However, such a conclusion is simply a misinterpretation of the presidential decree. A different thing is that the Government will in fact have little independence, because its co-operation with Viktor Kazantsev, plenipotentiary of President of the Russian Federation in the Southern federal region, and Vladimir Yelagin, federal minister for Chechnya, is completely incomprehensible.

In addition, it is certainly senseless to speak about the obligation to comply with the decisions of new Chechen authorities in the whole territory of Chechnya, taking into account the fact that a considerable part of the country is held by Russian armed forces who are absolutely independent of the administration. It is just this problem that another of Vladimir Putin's important decrees is concerned with - the decree about measures of tackling terrorism in the territory of the Northern-Caucasian region of the Russian Federation which includes the establishment of operation headquarters for management of the counter-terrorist campaign under the command of FSB (the Federal Security Service) chief Nikolai Patrushev. What the decree also introduces is regional operative headquarters headed by FSB chief deputy German Ugryumov. Ugryumov supervises all soldiers, collaborators and experts who are members of special forces. A commander of the United Federal Forces in the North Caucasus must follow decisions of the regional operative headquarters. Undoubtedly, as terrorism must be tackled by security services, not by the army, the transfer of the management of all activities of "power structures" to the FSB is just logical. However, the decisions came late and this is wrong. The end of the broad-scale military campaign was declared as early as the spring of 2000. The question is why the decision to reduce United Federal Forces and transfer the management to the FSB was not made in the spring of last year. The nearly one-year delay resulted in the seriously tarnished authority of Russian leadership in the eyes of Chechen people. One and a half or two years ago most of the Chechens were angry with the leaders of "independent" Ichkeria, but now they have a grudge against Russian soldiers and policemen. As a matter of fact, the abuses during "mopping-up operations" the subsequent disappearance of civilians, bribery and blackmail at checkpoints, as well as many other "costs" of the fight against terrorism are nowadays discussed even officially.

The above-mentioned forthcoming partial reduction and withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya have been backed by almost all sides involved. It was stressed that the reduction would secure supervision over activities of numerous "power structures" and decrease military losses as well as instances of human rights violations. On this issue it seems as if President Putin gave a welcome to Kadyrov's project although there has been no official written and well-defined document so far concerning that. In the beginning, Sergey Yastrzhembski, Putin's aide, claimed that the reduction of forces would start in February. Then, after some time, Gennadi Troshev, commander of the Northern-Caucasian military region mentioned March or April. And finally, also not right away after that, leaders of the Ministry of the Interior announced that its regiments, which make up a half of all forces in Chechnya, would not be reduced at all. The same holds for frontier guards. Besides, on the one hand, Moscow declares its intentions to cut the number of federal forces. On the other hand, military headquarters do not back down from the plans to deploy troops in 162 Chechen municipalities. It is clear that the reduction of federal forces and the process of its actual "undermining" are incompatible. At the same time, Valeri Baranov, commander of the United Forces, declared that soldiers would leave zones which showed no presence of bandits. However, everybody knows that there are no absolutely "clean" zones in Chechnya.

A number of contradictions emerged in the discussion on the extent of force reduction. For example, Akhmed Kadyrov considers it possible to reduce forces by half, with forty thousand soldiers remaining in Chechnya. This roughly corresponds, with twenty-five per-cent divergence, with the view of Valeri Manilov, first deputy chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Manilov announced that after a partial reduction federal forces in Chechnya should have about fifty thousand soldiers. But one of the most stringent critics of "force structures" practices, Aslambek Aslakhanov, Chechen Deputy in the Duma, Lower House of the Russian Parliament, calls for an almost three quarters reduction, with some twenty-two to twenty-four thousand soldiers remaining. Russian political leaders and the military command promise to reduce the number of checkpoints, transform military administrations into military commands and considerably lessen the curfew. However, there have been only words and no acts in this issue as well. Moreover, the whole range of Chechen political forces urge a refusal of the system of checkpoints and many other limitations.

Thus, a unified center of power in Chechnya has not yet been established. It is obvious that such a decision is difficult to realize solely for legal reasons. As a matter of fact, it is the President of the Russian Federation, embodying civil power, who is the only person in Russia to have the right of controlling "power structures". However, establishing so many power structures - administration and the Government of Chechnya, the offices of federal minister and presidential plenipotentiary in the Southern federal region, operative headquarters under the command of the Federal Security Service, and other minor structures - still leaves the question open as to who is responsible, besides President Putin, for the campaign in Chechnya."

Promising measures have also been announced in the economy. The Government of the Russian Federation has approved the project of the federal program for the reestablishment of the Chechen economy and social sphere in 2001. More than fourteen billion rubles have been earmarked for this purpose. Stanislav Ilyasov, Chechen government chief, suggests that a complete reestablishment of the Chechen economy will require forty billions rubles within two or three years. Russian authorities also plan to rebuild the capital of Chechnya, Grozny. However, nobody believes Russian leaders that Chechnya is no longer a "black hole" engulfing financial resources. The mechanisms of "stealing" money are well-known. Contrarily, the ones of inspecting expenses are still veiled. What all senior officials do is just promise to "thwart a criminal's plans" with great emphasis." The Government also ignores urges not to give Chechnya money as long as it is "teeming with" bandits. Really, the situation is difficult and seems to be like a vicious circle. Not to reestablish the country is ruled out, but almost everybody is sure that as far as the groups of bandits are capable of activity, any rebuilt house or a farm may be destroyed at any moment.

At the same time, it is obvious that all of these “good” decisions have more or less been made under pressure from the international community. It would be naive to think that it is just a coincidence that Moscow came up with them on the eve of the PACE session. Literally all of the military and political decisions more or less met Europe’s demands on Russia. This played an important role in the Russian delegation’s success at PACE. And the success is obvious. The Russian delegation managed to fully recover its rights. There is no longer a PACE resolution calling for the start of political negotiations with the separatists. The Russian delegation convinced the Europeans of the absence of a struggle for national liberation in the partisans’ actions. PACE appreciated Moscow’s actions concerning the creation of governmental institutions in Chechnya and the wider involvement of Chechens themselves in their work. However, these obvious achievements were quite soon in doubt. There is talk about an unexpected statement by Lord Russell-Johnson, the Chairman of PACE, who expressed his regret that no member country in the Council of Europe had filed a complaint to the European Court for Human Rights against Russia for its war in Chechnya. He promised that the Russian delegation must not waste this opportunity or next time it might be more than only disfranchised. Almost at the same time the European Parliament adopted a resolution concerning Chechnya, which once again speaks of “the unlawful detention of civilians in concentration camps”, “an immediate cease-fire” and “the start of negotiations with lawful representatives of the Republic of Chechnya in the presence of international organizations”. Thus it appears that the Chairman of the Russian State Duma Gennady Seleznev was right when saying that even if Chechnya is removed from the agenda of PACE sessions this organization will find other issues to lecture Russia on.

As a result, despite the “historic significance” of Moscow’s decisions, many political, military and international powers have made clear by countless actions and statements that the existing level of disagreements is so high that the tactics chosen by the federal center are far from being undisputed. It is true that practically no one directly opposes the presidential decrees. However, the plethora of alternative suggestions shows that far from the whole of Russia is satisfied. The President of Ingushetia Ruslan Aushev traditionally criticizes the Kremlin’s Chechen policies and as usual calls for negotiations with resistance forces. Another Chechen neighbor, the speaker of the Dagestani parliament Mukhu Aliyev, believes that the federal authorities are not making enough effort to stabilize the situation in Chechnya. He is calling for the creation of a single governmental body with the Russian president, which would be responsible for all matters: from military to economic and financial. In his opinion, the new Chechen administration is not even capable of ensuring its own security. At the same time, many Chechen politicians continue to stand up for their position, not believing the Kremlin to have finally clarified its own. For instance, Malik Saydullaev (who was unexpectedly labeled by some sources to be a British “agent of influence”) believes it is necessary to hold new presidential elections in Chechnya already this year. Otherwise, “we will not succeed in making it back into the Russian legislative area”. Aslambek Aslakhanov’s movement “the Union of Chechen Nations” is about to organize a “congress of the nations of Chechnya”, where it will be possible to “analyze the current situation and define means of further development, calmly, without shouting and conflict”. Ruslan Khasbulatov suggested the creation of a state committee for the reconstruction of Chechnya and reminded everyone of the suggestions concerning the creation of such a committee, to be headed by Khasbulatov himself, already sent to Vladimir Putin by many authoritative Chechens in April last year. But Russian leaders have never mentioned anything of the sort.

Finally, alternative suggestions were combined in their most complete form in the so-called “Nemtsov’s plan”, which is an exact antithesis of the decisions already made. This plan consists of two alternative programs and besides, does not include any new or original idea on Boris Nemtsov’s part. Still, we should salute the ability of the leader of the Union of Right Forces (SPS) to get things going. Moreover, the plan itself has become a very interesting social phenomenon, proving that support of Moscow’s actions is far from unquestionable. As is well known, the key theses of this plan are the creation of an 8th federal region on the territory of Chechnya; the appointment of a presidential representative of non-Chechen nationality with the authority of a governor-general; negotiations between the governor-general and representatives of armed units including Maskhadov’s and the reorganization of the republic’s system of governance from presidential to parliamentary. In the event that these actions are not undertaken, Nemtsov suggests dividing Chechnya into mountainous and flat-country regions. He would include the latter in the Stavropolsky region, declare the mountainous part to be a “rebel” territory, withdraw federal bodies and strengthen the borders of mountainous Chechnya with Dagestan, Ingushetia and the flat-country territory to the maximum.

The announcement of this plan and its delivery to the president of Russia provoked a strong and possibly inadequate response. It received hardly any positive feedback. Official Russian bodies pointed at the inadmissibility of implementing the theses of the plan and evaluated it as an attempt to “legalize Chechnya as a permanently active guerilla base”. Chechen authorities alluded to the insufficient political maturity of the leader of the SPS and his lack of knowledge about Chechnya. All of the ideas were commented on as a whole, although, as was said before, Nemtsov suggested two completely different scenarios. The proposal to give the northern territories of Chechnya to Stavropol provoked the most reactions, none of which again were positive. State Duma delegates even had to return to a discussion of a draft proposal to pass three regions previously tabled in the mid-1990s by Sergey Baburin, in order to immediately reject it. Unfortunately, the main result of discussions of the “Nemtsov’s plan” is likely to be a lack of confidence from both Russian society and its authorities that the means of settling the problem have been finally chosen.

The problem of Chechen separatist leaders remains the thorniest issue for Moscow. One can talk forever about their inability to seriously resist the federal forces but the daily deaths of Russian soldiers and militiamen do not stop and federal forces’ casualties in the course of the whole “anti-terrorist operation” have, according only to official data, already exceeded 3 thousand dead. The number of guerilla fighters, which according to various recent statements amounted to 2 thousand, has suddenly jumped to 5 thousand. Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the FSB, announced this exact number, specifying that only 1,5 thousand fighters were “irreconcilable”. It is unclear how he estimates the level of their irreconcilability but the seriousness of the problem is evident. At the same time the official and allegedly final refusal to negotiate with Aslan Maskhadov loses its persuasiveness when we realize that the Russian authorities are counting the days left till the end of his presidency. That means that the Russian government is having difficulty hiding the fact that it is attaching political importance to the leaders of “independent” Ichkeria and does not consider them only as “objects of extermination”. Besides, not only the constant supporters of this dialogue - Boris Nemtsov and Ruslan Aushev - are calling for negotiations with Maskhadov, but also Aslambek Aslakhanov. The latter makes it clear that supporters of the negotiations are also to be found around the president of the RF.

As for the separatists themselves, despite the Russian authorities’ deep indignation with journalists, Aslan Maskhadov continues to appear frequently in the mass media. He has recently admitted sanctioning the negotiations between the parliamentarians of Ichkeria and delegates of the State Duma, even suggesting Russian delegates acted with the consent of the Russian president. In spite of Maskhadov’s presidency coming to an end as soon as January 27th 2002, the parliament of Ichkeria has prolonged its own and Maskhadov’s mandate till “the full withdrawal of Russian forces”. Concurrently, the Russian bodies have stated that one of the guerilla leaders Ruslan Gelayev harshly criticized Aslan Maskhadov’s actions and called on “the warriors of jihad” to elect another leader. Gelayev himself denied this information through the Kavkaz-Center, as well as information that he has been engaged in negotiations with Akhmed Kadyrov. It is notable that he practically admitted a certain distance between himself, Maskhadov and Basayev, and stated that “our common cause does not have a single leadership”. Gelayev stated that as long as military operations take place in Chechnya the presidency of Maskhadov cannot be called into doubt and everybody has to support him. And once “we are victorious”, Gelayev suggests electing a Supreme Court to which all leaders of the opposition forces should be subordinate.

There are actually as many forecasts for the development of the situation in Chechnya as there are various plans for stabilization. The most optimistic ones predict the situation to already be improving by spring this year. Pessimistic forecasts prevail and are more varied. It is, however, obvious to everyone that the Chechen problem will continue for a long time.