Chechnya - A Zone of Irresponsibility (Part I - The Outlook from Moscow)by Ilya Maksakov, correspondent of „Nezavisimaya gazeta“
special to Prague Watchdog (www.watchdog.cz)
The crisis in Chechnya has become an integral part of life in Russia and, strangely enough, this manifests itself in facts excluding each another. On the one hand, authorities reaffirm that the “basic aims in Chechnya have been achieved“, but on the other hand, they do not object to the political way of tackling the crisis, although they give virtually no information what political methods are in question and show an obvious state of inactivity.
Russian political circles have been making an eager effort to influence the activities of the Kremlin. However, there is no possibility of achieving that and, consequently, the criticism of Russian senior officials is rising. As a matter of fact, the majority of Russian society, having become accustomed to the conflict, is continuously backing the federal forces’ campaign in Chechnya. At the same time, daily losses and the absence of any clear perspective is making people drained from the situation. As it was a year ago, military officials still give promises that the anti-terrorist campaign will soon be ended, but they are beginning to look less convincing in their declarations.
Chechen politicians loyal to Moscow continue clearing up relations among one another, while separatists’ leaders have gone into an intangible reality or, as Sergey Yastrzhembsky put it, they are phantoms who seem to exist and even create severe damages to the federal forces and to politics in Russia, though being in a sort of virtual world such as appearing on the Internet or in newspapers.
The outlook from Moscow
President Vladimir Putin has not commented on the Chechen topic very often in recent days. Nevertheless, he has not been allowed to ignore it completely. Just before and during his visit to France in the end of October he declared that basic aims, set a year ago, were achieved and the anti-terrorist operation was in its final stage. In his response to Western criticism he brought about following question: „So are we refused the right of self-defense?“, while warning his opponents at the same time by saying: „If terrorism is not stopped in Chechnya, it will thrive in Russia tomorrow and threaten abroad once again.“ He said there are two main tasks – to prevent the possibility of Chechnya being used as a bridge-head for an attack on Russia, and to rid Chechnya of fundamentalism. Talking about the perspectives of a political method of tackling the crisis, Putin confirmed that there will be democratic elections in Chechnya „as soon as we can see the right conditions for that.“
Some time ago, during his talks with senior Russian military officials, Putin attracted observers’ attention by saying: „To secure that the territory does not become a source of interregional and ethnic conflicts, rather than the formal status of the Chechen Republic, is of the highest importance.“ He assured the public of the perspective that the conflict in Chechnya and the country’s future status would be determined by political means only. The unexpected comment had to be cleared by Sergey Yastrzhembsky, the president’s closest official. As he put it, the only question is whether Chechnya becomes a presidential or a parliamentary republic, alternatively, the one with a mixed form of governing. Yastrzhembsky again declared the objectives of the anti-terrorist campaign. The first, being the most important goal, the wiping-out of the „terrorist enclave“; the second is the re-introduction of the Russian constitution and the enforcement of Russian laws’ in the territory of the Chechen Republic; the third is the development of a social sphere. What is interesting, although controversial with his next declarations, Yastrzhembsky stressed that only after the wiping-out of the terrorist gangs would it be time to deal with the other two aims.
Clearly, the Kremlin’s position stays firm, though giving no information about either the character or any deadline of the crisis’ solution. This just leads to the highlight of alternative proposals and the re-awakening of criticism aimed at the Russian government. Interestingly enough, even Viktor Kazantsev, plenipotentiary of the president in the Southern federal region, made it clear that the present situation in Chechnya requires sweeping changes. As early as in October he expressed discontent over the structure of administration in Chechnya, and his firm determination to change it. His proposal is based on the full centralization of the administration as well as on the aim to introduce the post of a coordinator who would assume responsibility „for economy, the monitoring of financial flows, and the activities of armed structures – in other words for everything.“ Kazantsev assumed that his reform would be carried out in November, with everybody being aware of the fact that it does not count on either the head of Chechen administration Akhmed Kadyrov or the present administration itself. Firstly, the supervision of armed structures will never be assigned to a Chechen politician; secondly, the administration of the Chechen Republic, established by the decree of the Russian president, has received no economic and political powers save for the right to form local authorities.
Kazantsev’s statements gave rise to a plan of substitution on the post of a leading official in Chechnya. Certain political circles are toying with the idea that Gennadi Troshev, a commander of the Northern-Caucasus military region, should replace Akhmed Kadyrov. General Gennadi Troshev kept on denying this possibility, though doing it by making everybody believe that Kadyrov’s administration is coming to its final moment. Troshev claimed that Kadyrov’s activities lacked consistency with his tending to administrative intrigues instead of tackling real problems, and that Kadyrov „is trying to ease internal problems in Chechnya by our hands.“ At the same time, although the general said that he couldn’t imagine himself out of the army, military officials’ moving on to politics is a „natural process“ as „the country’s administration requires fair people who have a political way of thinking“. This made clear that the Kremlin was presenting a really exact program of future activities and that it has to decide whether this program will be accepted or not.
Similar proposals were discussed within the majority of political authorities as well. Many considered establishing Chechen administration just after the presidential election in Russia as a half-hearted measure, and the appeal for the introduction of a presidential or a federal governing in Chechnya as weak. Duma, the lower chamber of the Russian parliament, has discussed the Chechen crisis several times in September and October, which has resulted only in producing a number of recommendations for the Kremlin and all of the executive authorities. One piece of advice coincided with Viktor Kazantsev’s recommendation – introducing either the post of a special representative of the Russian president in Chechnya, or the vice-presidency with the power of coordinating and checking the activities of federal ministries and departments, including military ones. Moreover, Russian MPs paid extraordinary attention to the question of the observance of human rights in Chechnya. As a matter of fact, placing this question on the agenda of September 26 parliamentary discussions, in the presence of high representatives of the Council of Europe and PACE, has been the first criticism of the federal forces at such a high diplomatic level since the beginning of the second campaign in Chechnya. Duma urged the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Home Affairs to take extra measures to prevent the inadequate use of power, decrease the number of checkpoints, canceling those in three northern regions of Chechnya and declaring them „zones of peace“. MPs also appealed for checking all of the facts of Chechen arrests carried out by the Ministry of Interior and the Federal Security Service (FSB), and advocated discussing this question at the Security Council. Also, Russian administration got into a troubled position facing the problem of Chechen refugees’ security in winter. As a matter of fact, Russian MPs and officials cooperating with international organizations that supervise the observing of human rights in Chechnya and living conditions of refugees, say openly in their lobby talks that „they are fed up with lying, even though they have to lie“.
As there was no reaction from the side of the authorities, November 3 saw a closed meeting of Duma and the chiefs of ministries and departments handling the Chechen conflict. The meeting unveiled the fact that executive and legislative powers are far from having the same views on the issue. If the session were open, it would certainly result in a scandal, for MPs as well as officials sometimes argued using a high tone and asked each other for choosing their words carefully. The representatives of executive power were very discontented by the interference of MPs in their work, while Duma representatives felt dissatisfaction with that work.
Thus, the Kremlin faced two challenges – either to change its policy in Chechnya or to give another response to the appeals. It seemed that the Kremlin was ready for changes at the beginning. Sergey Yastrzhembsky said that he „would commit a sin of lying“ if he claimed that Moscow was happy about the activities of the Chechen administration. He considered the situation as stagnant and pointed out „a certain move“ that must be done.
At the same time, various political powers and financial circles took up lobby fights for the impact from the president’s decision, advocating certain programs and candidates. As a result, in late November, Vladimir Putin gave his assent to the introduction of the post of a minister coordinating the activities of federal executive authorities in the economic and social development of Chechnya. The post was assigned to 45-year old Vladimir Yelagin, a former top administrator in the Orenburg region who recently worked as a secretary for the chairman of the state building corporation Gosstroy. Evidently, even though that decision was in stark contrast with the suggestions and ideas given to the president, it received stalwart support by all senior officials. In his explanations of the president’s act, Sergey Yastrzhembsky pointed out that Moscow takes for granted the impossibility of tackling the crisis in Chechnya only by means of power. The antiterrorist campaign has to be accompanied by handling the issue of economic and social development of the country (notice that, as mentioned above, not a long time ago had Yastrzhembsky suggested the question of economic and social development should come only after terrorist gangs were wiped out).
Viktor Khristenko, vice-premier and chairman of the governmental commission on the re-establishment of social and economic spheres, is of the opinion that the introduction of the ministerial post proves that the conflict was attached to a national importance. Vladimir Kalamanov, a special representative for the observance of human freedom and rights in Chechnya, backed the president’s decision claiming that there had been no exactly elaborated mechanism of the federal authorities’ coordination, with chaos and disorder reigning there for months. The head of the independent public commission on Chechnya, Pavel Krasheninnikov, sharing typical practice, expressed evident doubts. Even though he backed the president’s decree, he considers it insufficient and half-hearted, urging the need to introduce the post of vice-premier who would handle economic and social problems as well as those of military character.
As a result, we can conclude that the Kremlin decided not to run the risk of assuming an absolute responsibility for the crisis’ tackling by concentrating overall power in Chechnya in one’s hands. Surely, as Vladimir Kalamanov put it, the fact that chaos and disorder reigned in Chechnya was by no means because of the absence of a minister for social-economic development of the country. Vladimir Elagin’s best determinations can be hampered by the endless war of guerillas, bomb-terrorists, saboteurs or what ever we call them, and by the fact that military and judiciary authorities remain under no supervision. The new minister, although he does not have enough power to influence the overall handling of the crisis, he is a fairly powerful figure that many would like to be. Vladimir Yelagin himself outlined his aims: to establish financial flows leading to Chechnya in the way that they are under a perfect supervision and that money gets to its destination. This will involve financial sources of huge economic empires such as „UES of Russia“ (United Energy System), „Gazprom“, or the Ministry of Information.
To conclude, be it Russian authorities’ desire or not, all aspects show the crisis in Chechnya is slowly going to conserve. Scarcely anybody doubts that many give a warm welcome to it. The smouldering conflict and the total lack of rule of law in the country turns Chechnya into a good shooting-range as well as a financial „black hole“. It is possible that Moscow is afraid of the centralization of power in Chechnya due to a tremendous responsibility that could have an undermining influence on that power, or because of the necessary legal expenses that would be required. This would be understandable but what officials’ explanations raise is only doubts. Sergey Yastrzhembsky expressed his view that it is not necessary to introduce a presidential form of governing in Chechnya as „there hasto be cogent grounds for that“. Surprisingly enough, federal authorities do not see the cogent grounds in the following facts: federal forces suffer losses that make up as many as the crew of a Kursk-like nuclear submarine every month; Chechen inhabitants are totally deprived of any rights, and often the right to live; the smouldering crisis in Chechnya means a threat of losing stability all over the Northern Caucasus. However, to be fair, it is worth mentioning that Russian senior officials, commenting on the crisis in private debates, confirm that the question of reforming management in Chechnya as well as the issue of Gennady Troshev’s assignment are far from being closed.
As far as the actual military conflict is concerned, Russian military and political representations keep on beaming with optimism and thus make the situation increasingly confusing. For instance, Sergey Yastrzhembsky is convinced that federal forces have prospects of „ringing down the curtain on the military phase“ by the end of winter this year. However, it was as early as in April this year that officials declared „the military phase“ ended with special operations being started. A different terminology, though of the same meaning, is used by the Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev. Marshal Sergeyev is assured that federal forces plan to destroy the final troop of extremists in winter. Valery Baranov, commander of united forces, comes with an echo promising that the situation in Chechnya will be normalized „in political, military and economic spheres“ during winter. The Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Anatoly Kvashnin, chooses his words more carefully urging not to link the destruction of individual terrorists with particular deadlines. However, he declares that „bandits will be exterminated“.
Similarly, Russian military authorities do not throw much light on the question of enemy numbers. Only those who really do not want to cannot see that official summaries have been showing the same number of enemies for a long time, regardless of everyday reports on the federal forces’ successful operations. In this case, it is possible to use the evidence that President Putin has at his disposal. According to these numbers, there were 5 - 6 thousand people in military gangs in the territory of Chechnya at the beginning of the war, while today there are some 1000 – 1200 bandits, united in 4 – 5 isolated groups. As the same statistics suggest, the overall casualties of Russian military forces during operations in Northern Caucasus make up 2600. Anatoly Kvashnin admits that „the bandits sometimes successfully operate at high tactical levels and commit sabotage and acts of terrorism resulting in the casualties of Russian soldiers.“ Kvashnin blames the low professionalism of the soldiers in the time of units’ rotation.
The second part, "The Outlook from Chechnya", is available here. |
