CHECHNYA LINKS LIBRARY

The contradictory results of two years of war in Chechnya.

For two years already a war has been taking place in Chechnya, or using the language of officialdom an anti-terrorist operation. A partisan invasion into Dagestan from the territory of Chechnya, supported by local extremists, occurred at the beginning of August 1999. They succeeded in occupying several villages in the Botlikhsky and Tsumadinsky regions for a short while. After their expulsion several villages of the Kadarskaya zone of the Buynaksky region were blocked off and proclaimed “independent Islamic territory”. Almost simultaneously, partisans invaded the Novolaksky region of Chechnya at the beginning of September 1999.

After the destruction of Karamakhinsky, Chabanmakhinsky and Kadarsky Vakhabits and the partisans’ expulsion from the Novolak region, Russian troops crossed the administrative border of Chechnya at the beginning of October 1999 and advanced far inland into the territory of the republic, so beginning a new war.

One of the main conclusions of the past two years is that the second Chechen campaign, already lasting longer than the first one, does not seem to be coming to an end. But this is the only final conclusion, all others are just intermediates and earnestly show that the Chechen crisis is going to last.

Strangely, despite Russian society’s increasing tiredness with the Chechen war taking human lives daily, no absolute opponents of federal actions in Chechnya have appeared in the last two years, discounting human rights and radical organizations. According to opinion polls the percentage of the population supporting operations in Chechnya is decreasing but is still at a high level. Criticism of certain Moscow actions on the part of some leading political forces is intensifying significantly but the ultimate goals of the anti-terrorist operation - preserving territorial integrity and the struggle against terrorism - are not called into question by anyone.

It is also remarkable that skeptics note only the negative aspects in the development of the situation in Chechnya thinking that even minimal progress is not capable of changing the situation for the better. Supporters of the federal forces’ actions, as well as representatives of the authorities, present any success as a significant achievement, although unwillingly admitting mistakes and even crimes in the course of the conduct of operations. Actually, one of the peculiarities of events in Chechnya is that all opinions, even apposite ones, can be honest, fair and objective in their own way. Hence, trying to refrain from taking to anyone’s position, I will try to sum up the events of the past two years, as they appear to optimists and skeptics; in other words, I will note the achievements and lack of positive results in three areas - military, political and socio-economic.

An optimist’s view

The Russian military command in Chechnya announced the completion of military operations as early as spring 2000. Indeed, the last large-scale fighting took place in Komsomolskoye village, where Chechen fighters suffered serious losses, to the order of hundreds of people which even the separatists’ propaganda did not venture to hide. A Russian flag was raised over every town and village in Chechnya as a symbol of victory over international terrorism. Virtually no large guerilla groupings remain and there is no large-scale fighting.

The neutralisation of Chechen military leaders in the country has adopted a real, rather than mythical character. Let us remind ourselves of the deaths of Arbi Barayev and the influential Arab mercenary Abu Umar. The killing of field commander Magomed Tsagarayev could be listed here as well. However, the Russian special services were never linked to that - although the 15-year-old Chechen teenager who shot the guerilla fighter dead was granted the The Hero of Russia award in memoriam.

At the same time in the Sharo-Argun valley on the Russian-Georgian border Russian border guards have intensified their operations and for the first time effectively prevented a detachment of mercenaries, who used to move freely from Georgia to Russia, from crossing the border. Large-scale and - as the Russian military command puts it – successful “special operations” are being carried out throughout almost the whole of Chechnya.

Political developments in Chechnya stem from a decree issued by Russian President Vladimir Putin in January 2001 according to which Chechnya’s civil administration, headed by Akhmad Kadyrov, ceased to have temporary status and became a full power body, and a government was established in Chechnya. The relocation of Chechnya’s administration from Gudermes to Grozny in late April 2001 was of huge importance. A political solution to the conflict in Chechnya remains on the agenda but Moscow says that searches for a solution are being carried out continuously. For example, the co-chairman of the Joint Working Group of the Russian State Duma and the Parliamentary

Assembly of the Council of Europe on Chechnya said in an interview to the author that the Russian President has enough information to understand profoundly the essence of the problem and will recognise the moment when a political solution to the conflict will have to be put into practice. According to Rogozin, Putin is fully responsible for the situation in Russian regions.

Moscow gives the following examples for a political solution to the conflict. Republic and local power structures, the judicial system and law enforcement agencies have been almost completely reconstructed. A consultative body has been set up at the head of Chechnya’s pro-Moscow administration with the aim of drafting Chechnya’s Constitution and the legislation that will be necessary for the holding of elections in Chechnya. Besides that, in early June 2001 Bislan Gantamirov was appointed chief federal inspector in the Southern Federal Region and charged with coordinating work on drafting Chechnya’s Constitution. Gantamirov himself told the author that his task is to launch a constitutional process and that the final goal should be the adoption of the republic’s legislation, which would create a single power centre that would coordinate political, economic and military life in Chechnya. In Gantamirov’s opinion, this will also be a political solution.

In socio-economic terms, Russian and (pro-Moscow) Chechen authorities list among their successes the construction of two heating stations and the construction of a plant for the production of houses, cement works, brick works, agricultural processing plants and bakeries. Large industrial plants as well as residential buildings are being reconstructed, jobs are being created and terms for the return of refugees to the republic are being improved. A record grain crop was reported and railway transport relaunched in the republic. Oil output is on the rise and one national and ten local newspapers are being published. And the list continues.

A sceptic’s view

However, if description of the situation in Chechnya was confined only to the above-mentioned circumstances, there would have been no Chechen crisis. And the crisis not only continues but is aggravated so much that every day enhances its irreversibility. The federal forces count among their successes that only uncoordinated, small and disorganized units of partisans now remain in the republic. However, it is these groups that cause most damage to the Russian armed forces. Servicemen and militiamen get killed in Chechnya daily, every month their losses count at least 100 men. The total casualties of the second Chechen campaign already exceed three and a half thousand people, and this is only according to official information. Most diversions and assaults happen in long ago “liberated” Grozny. The Chechen capital remains the most dangerous place in the republic, where the concentration of partisans is perhaps at its highest. Partisans’ sorties are often made in the “calm” northern regions and they cause as much damage to federal armed forces as they would somewhere in the mountains.

Separatist leaders certainly admit that they have been damaged at command level. (By the way, as per some information, the death of Arbi Barayev was not the result of a special operation but of a Chechen vendetta). But up to now their capability to conduct major diversions and even initialize large-scale fights is still clear. Recent events in the Vedensky district have maybe not resulted in the establishment of partisan authority there, as they allege, but they confirm that the federal forces are not in total control of the situation in the mountains (the existence of mujahhedins’ roadblock, admitted by the Russian military, is proof of that).

Such an important task as the protection of civilians is still unfulfilled. Murders of civilians and whole families happen almost daily, while there are still no official statistics for victims among the civilian population. The situation can be described in highly expressive detail. Over 30 of 500 Russian civilians remaining in the Chechen capital have been killed in Grozny in the few last months. In the course of the 3 last months over 20 leaders of district and village administrations and imams of mosques have been killed in Chechnya. Every night in various settlements around Chechnya partisans burst into the homes of people who have unluckily agreed to co-operate with federal authorities. At best they beat them, at worst they murder whole families.

Local civilians suffer from the actions of the federal armed forces on a bigger scale. Mop-up operations, extortion and detentions at roadblocks and disappearances seem to be uncontrolled by any authorities. This is talked about at the highest official level but it still continues. Recent incidents involving mop-up operations in Assinovskaya, Sernovodsk and Kurchaloy are just accidentally revealed facts from a multitude of cases of unlawful actions towards civilians on the part of “federals”.

Nothing is as smooth in the political settlement of the crisis as the Russian authorities present it. The main problem is as yet unsolved. And it does not lie in the creation of a constitution and laws and the holding of elections. Chechnya is practically the only subject of the Russian Federation where real power is in the hands of the military and the civil governing body is limited in their activities. This is why the problem of adjusting the relations between these two powers is the most important part of the political process. The problem of the protection of human rights in Chechnya also lies in this, which means that there will be no order in Chechnya while the military do not return to barracks and all power, including control over power bodies, is not within the civil authorities’ competence. Not withstanding the growing demoralization of the military due to their impunity. The case of colonel Budanov, as with the mop-up operations in Assinovskaya, Sernovodsk and Kurchaloy, is also just the tip of the iceberg.

The following aspect is also an important factor regarding the military. As power bodies are the only real power in Chechnya they are supposed to be responsible for everything happening in the republic including the total criminalization of the situation. Information coming from Chechnya is quite scant thanks to the military’s actions but it is still sufficient to know that whole columns of tank trucks daily leave the republic for neighbouring regions and that no tank truck happened to somehow run over a field charge. The republic’s authorities are certainly unable to prevent illegal oil-production. It is also clear that if, for instance, all kinds of criminality are to prosper in Moscow or somewhere in Ryazan, then Chechnya is the perfect place for it. However, there is no information about drug, arms or even human organ trafficking coming from the warring republic.

That is why the republic’s authorities headed by Akhmad Kadyrov and Stanislav Ilyasov have been continuously appealing to Moscow to give them control over the military. They are calling for the appointment of the military commandant of Chechnya as vice-chairman of the government, the creation of a ministry of internal affairs for the republic and a cut down on the number of roadblocks. There are also more cardinal plans in existence: for instance, the allocation of the functions of Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister and chairman of the governmental commission for reconstruction to Chechnya’s (pro-Moscow) Prime Minister. This would place all power bodies under his authority and create a united center for the co-ordination of economic activities. But none of this has been done by Moscow, despite continuous repetition of its mantra of adherence to a political settlement.

Hence the lack of bewilderment at the growing number of settlement plans appearing. The “plans” of Kadyrov, Nemtsov, Troshev, Rogozin, Kulikov, Mitrofanov, Aslakhanov, Maigov, Gantamirov and others are already in existence. There is a great number of ideas in them – the separation of Chechnya into mountainous and flat country parts, the creation of the 8th federal district in the republic, the placing of Grozny under the direct authority of Moscow, the removal of the entire Russian population from the republic, the holding of a congress of the Chechen nation, persuading the partisans to return to a peaceful life using their relatives etc. This certainly leads to numerous political conflicts.

The already mentioned appointment of Gantamirov followed a far from correct procedure. The question is what relation Gantamirov himself and his senior, presidential plenipotentiary Viktor Kazantsev, have to the constitution of the republic if the only source of power in Chechnya can be the Chechen nation. Thus the prerogative of developing the constitution belongs to the political governing body of the nation, i.e. the administration of Akhmad Kadyrov. Particularly since his plan of settlement was generally approved by the Russian President in January this year. It is not strange that after the appointment of Gantamirov, Kadyrov created a consultation council in his administration, intended to develop a legislative base and a constitution of the republic among other things. This council is supposed to become a prototype for a future parliament of the republic. As is seen, the risk of having at least two projects on the constitution is clear.

Whilst this mess remains in the political sphere, the problem of negotiations with separatist leaders is topical, at least while they are still alive and at liberty. Representatives of Moscow, already tired of talking about the inadmissibility of these political contacts, will keep on responding to certain appeals by Russian political forces. It is not surprising that rumours are spreading that Dzhokhar Dudayev is still alive when you consider the lack of political decisions by Moscow. Even high-ranking political representatives disseminate such assumptions.

Talking about economic achievements is probably out of place in these conditions. Even so not everything is perfect in this regard. We can note for a start that no one is insured against a repetition of the events of the first Chechen campaign when many “reconstructed” objects were just blown up by “partisans”. As per the confession of Stanislav Ilyasov, some federal customers do not fulfill the existing strict directives of the President of Russia concerning reconstruction work. The Chechen authorities cannot understand how they are not afraid of ignoring the directives. The work of half of the 25 federal customers participating in the reconstruction program for 2001 has stopped. Work is not continuing in the area of reconstruction of residential buildings. People do not know if they will get compensation for the destruction of their homes. The Russian government does not refuse compensation but no exact resolutions have been made. Due to a lack of assets the shadow economy prospers while the Chechen government has to buy construction materials on credit, which is significantly more expensive. That is why the word “sabotage” is commonly used in Grozny.

Another literally visible confirmation of the lack of progress in the solution of Chechnya’s problems are the burning oil wells around Grozny. No sooner does Stanislav Ilyasov solemnly announce that all oil wells have finally been put out, than Grozny appears to be surrounded by burning torches again. Chechnya’s (pro-Moscow) authorities accepted the decree of the president of the Russian Federation on the delimitation of property into federal and republic positively. However another appeal of the Chechen authorities – to place the functions of directorship of the sole customer for reconstruction works with the government of Chechnya – still remains unanswered. No improvements from federal reconstruction programs for 2002-2003 are expected here without it being answered.

Finally, one of the key features in the socio-economic sphere, often related to both political and security areas, is the problem of Chechen refugees in Ingushetia. Chechen authorities are ready to accept 50 thousand forced migrants in the republic up to the end of this year, but people are afraid to return home, especially after mop-up operations. Meanwhile the refugee factor becomes grounds for political conflict; those participating in the conflicts accuse the refugees of fulfilling the orders of separatist leaders on the one hand, and calling for a solution to all of their problems on the other. It is not accidental that Russia attended to measures for the most urgent return of refugees to Chechnya at the highest level – a meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

****

In all contradiction the analysis of the situation in Chechnya and of ways out of the crisis, an amazing unanimity of forecasts of the situation’s development can be seen - no improvements are expected in the very near future. Now there is a situation where all existing problems are apparently well known and the ways towards their solution are clear but none of them is getting solved and all of the authorities’ and numerous political forces’ actions are reminders of some sort of damnation.

Translated by Prague Watchdog