One War, Two ChechnyasIlya Maksakov for Prague Watchdog
For a variety of reasons it is difficult to arrive at an objective judgment on the domestic politics of Chechnya. Firstly, the war situation does not facilitate discussion on political processes. Secondly, real political agendas are blurred by massive propaganda from each side of the conflict. Thirdly, the Chechens are the victims of that self-confessed national disease of ‘everyone wanting to be a leader.’ Above all, Chechnya is politically de facto divided into two parts, which prevents one from getting a single political picture. The two Chechnyas – the independent Ichkeria and the Russian Subject-State – are radically different entities.
Ichkeria
Unlike the situation during the first Chechen war, there is now an absence of information concerning the separatist leaders, their mutual relationships and the internal pecking order. Currently the main information source is the Kavkaz-Center controlled from the United Arab Emirates headed by Movladi Udugov. The Kavkaz-Center’s views reflect political stance of Udugov and the separatist ultra-radical wing, which includes Shamil Basayev, Khattab, the nomad – Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and others. However, the Kavkaz-Center provides a minimum of hard information given that its output is largely warlike propaganda, thereby reducing its usefulness of Russian observers. Nevertheless, it is quite an interesting phenomenon.
Aslan Maskhadov’s ideological and propaganda arsenal is limited to his public speeches reported in the Western media in which Shamil Basayev has already been targeted for attack. This suggests that Maskhadov is no longer dependent on the Kavkaz-Center or Movladi Udugov and it seems reasonable to assume that feuding among the separatist leaders, which began after Maskhadov’s election as president in January 1997, is continuing, despite assertions to the contrary by all parties.
Maskhadov’s main claim to credibility stems from his democratic mandate which both Chechen radicals and federation politicians are obliged to acknowledge. Despite Moscow’s position that Maskhadov has long since lost political legitimacy and their labelling of him as ‘ex-president’, in reality it has to take account of the democratically expressed will of the Chechen people. Repeated attempts to undermine him have failed, as for example recently, when Akhmad Kadyrov was appointed head of the Chechen administration in an attempt to force members of Maskhadov’s cabinet to combine to begin proceedings to force him out of office.
Of course Maskhadov is aware of the strength of his position and continues to assert that Moscow will have to open negotiations with him and him alone. Some Russian politicians agree with this prognosis, for the longer the war continues, the more this seems to be the preferred option and the one often canvassed by the Kremlin despite its insistence that the only subject it will discuss with Maskhadov is Chechen capitulation.
In any event, if negotiations materialize, the Chechen President will have to demonstrate his ability to bring an end to hostilities by asserting his personal authority and taking the situation in hand. At present the extent of Maskhadov’s power off the field of battle is limited although the influence of Shamil Basayev is correspondingly somewhat exaggerated.
Yusup Soslambekov, recently deceased, related to the writer an account of the Chechen withdrawal from the winter defence of Grozny. The guerrillas in the majority favoured prolonging the fight for the city and could have continued to hold it for as long as they wished. Following Basayev’s demand for withdrawal, several thousand fighters found that their route to Alkhan-Khala was blocked by a minefield. After the deaths of Lecha Dudayev and Kunkarpasha Israpilov, Basayev was offered a choice by his fellow-commanders – either agree with the majority and return to Grozny or cross the minefield ahead of his men. And this is how amir Shamil lost his leg and not as a result of a well-planned operation by Russian special forces. This fact reflects poorly on his status as a leader.
There is also considerable evidence to support the view that the very existence of the most hated Chechen guerrilla leaders is advantageous to the Russian military. In Chechnya, as Chechens admit, the exact whereabouts of Maskhadov, Basayev, Barayev or Khattab is well known. But instead of killing or arresting them, Russian forces launch endless raids and arrest ‘field commanders’ who acquire their fame in the process.
Conflicts among the guerrilla leaders are not the invention of the Russian propaganda apparatus. The confrontation between Maskhadov and Basayev, Udugov and Khattab is well-known and Chechen sources acknowledge that there is bad blood between Ruslan Gelayev and Arbi Barayev, despite denials from Maskhadov’s supporters who insist that Gelayev is in charge and gives Barayev his orders.
Clearly, there is confrontation between the two but, perhaps for reasons other than those suggested by Russian propaganda. Finance from foreign sponsors and Barayev’s refusal to help Gelayev during the defence of the village of Komsomolskoye, where the problem originated, are discounted as factors in the conflict. Chechen information sources suggest that Barayev’s group paid a sum of money for safe passage through federal positions. When rumours of this reached the other guerrillas, they attempted the mountain descent through the same village only to find that the Russian occupiers were unwilling to allow them to escape and attacked them.
Due to poor communications, the flood of guerrillas descending the mountain could not be stopped and they were obliged to stand and defend their positions. As a result, the village, previously under Gelayev’s control, was razed to the ground with opposition casualties of at least 400 according to the Chechens or 1200 according to the Russian account. Gelayev found it impossible to forgive Barayev for his part in the disaster.
All this tends to indicate that the future of the Chechen leaders is difficult to predict and is influenced by factors outside their control. Whether they are killed or arrested, flee abroad or live to a ripe old age in Chechnya will largely be determined by Moscow.
The Subject-State of the Russian Federation
From the very inception of ‘counter terrorist’ operations, Chechen politicians loyal to Moscow entered into a determined power struggle. Some were complete unknowns, some had just been released from prison and others were promising political debutants. Above all, they were completely disunited as each paraded his personality and claim to be uniquely suited to be a leader of the republic. Many bolstered their ambitions with lavish promises to promote the welfare of the Chechen people.
As the Kremlin procrastinated over its Chechen policy, clearly ruling out from the start both the option of a democratic election and the appointment of a Chechen to head the new administration, a political structure was being developed under Nikolai Koshman. All of which makes the appointment of Akhmad Kadyrov quite a puzzle. Mufti Kadyrov is a controversial figure whose personality is extremely difficult to assess.
Critics of Kadyrov as Moscow’s man point out to the failure of the policy of puppet leaders, given that Kadyrov’s power depends totally on Russian military backing. One has to treat with cynicism the amazing transformation of the man once committed to jihad into the present active defender of Russian interests. Many Chechens who know Kadyrov personally question his religious expertise, alleging that he does not have knowledge of Arabic. Some observers say that he often acts more like a gangland boss than a religious leader. Neither he nor other appointees were able to unite the Chechen population.
In his defence, Kadyrov’s supporters cite his stand against Shamil Basayev in Dagestan last August and say that he even went to Khasavyurt to express solidarity with the people of Dagestan resulting in him receiving greater support from Makhachkala officials than any other Chechen politician. His courageous struggle against wahhabism is also to his credit and he has been seen as a reliable partner by Moscow since he was denounced by Maskhadov as an enemy of the Chechen people.
Nevertheless, Kadyrov’s appointment was a difficult one for Moscow. Originally, when a Russian appointee to the Chechen leadership was under consideration, Kadyrov was promised support in the elections to the State Duma. Finally, he was chosen to head the Chechen administration with substantial curtailment of his powers when it was realised that the decision could lead to unpredictable consequences. Thus a Russian presidential decree limits the remit of the head of the Chechen administration to the area of local government. All federal functions are exercised by the territory’s departments and institutions. Each time Kadyrov attempts to establish his own departments, Moscow reminds him not to exceed his powers.
Some allege that Kadyrov’s appointment was simply a ruse by Moscow to permit a Chechen to head the administration only to declare him unfit for the position and replace him with a Russian. If that is true, it simply demonstrates Moscow’s confusion over the best policy to pursue in the Northern Caucasus.
Moscow’s actions are in fact equivocal with each new decision getting in the way of previous plans as the case of Bislan Gantamirov demonstrates. Grozny’s former mayor was released from prison and made leader of the Chechen Militia with the goal of waging war on the separatists. Subsequently, no reference to the Chechen Militia could be found in the official organisation structure of the Ministry of Domestic Affairs of the Russian Federation. It was later disclosed that the Russian President had never passed any decrees in relation to the appointment. Gantamirov is still officially the deputy-head of the administration but this is denied by Kadyrov supporters. His raid in Gudermes aimed at ‘eliminating all bandits from the administration’ – with the prosecutor’s office refusing to initiate proceedings in the case – showed clearly that Moscow is using him for very specific goals, which Gantamirov finds convenient.
Pro-Moscow politicians feel the need to consolidate all anti-separatist forces, however, they are even unable to gather twenty people who would appoint a common leader. The idea of appointment of Ruslan Khasbulatov generated a record number of supporters but it was opposed by the then mufti Akhmad Kadyrov and Malik Saidulayev, head of the non-existing Chechen State Council. Thus while the followers of Jokhar Dudayev at least in words demonstrate unity in their ranks, pro-Moscow politicians not only fail to reach agreement but both in Moscow and in Chechnya they enter into open arguments about their relations, sometimes with automatic rifles in their hands.
Ilya Maksakov is a correspondent of the Moscow daily „Nezavisimaya gazeta“.
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